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Abstract
Social insurance programs, including Unemployment Insurance (UI), have been adopted in
many countries where informal employment is prevalent and monitoring of eligibility imperfect.
Whether social insurance programs can increase welfare in such a context often remains an open
question. To address this issue, we study the Brazilian UI program. Social insurance trades
o welfare gains from providing income support and eciency costs from distorting behaviors.
Imperfect monitoring may both exacerbate behavioral responses and, with the possibility to
work informally, reduce the need for insurance. Using matched employee{employer data, and
two complementary empirical strategies, we estimate the impacts of UI extensions on program
and labor market outcomes and their eciency costs. We nd large percentage reductions
in hazard rates of formal reemployment, in particular around benet exhaustion. However,
because hazard rates are very low, UI has little impact on formal reemployment and eciency
costs amount to only 5%{11% of the cost of extending benets. Using survey data, we further
estimate that 35% of our sample of job{losers is actually unemployed after 5 months of UI, a
gure comparable to the US. In our normative framework, these results imply that even a low
social value of insurance is consistent with an increase in welfare from extending UI. We obtain
that welfare eects from the existing UI program are likely to be positive and may be sizeable.
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Social insurance accounts for a smaller share of GDP or government spendings in poorer coun-
tries and this share is strongly associated with income per capita (Chetty and Finkelstein, 2011).
Consistent with this relationship,1 social insurance and transfer programs have been expanding in
middle{income and developing countries. Those expansions have generated a large body of empir-
ical work to assess programs' impacts on several outcomes.2 However, results from this literature
are seldom easily translated into a cost{benet framework. Therefore, whether conditions were met
for those programs to increase welfare in implementing countries often remains an open question.
Major concerns for the implementation of social insurance and transfer programs in poorer
countries are twofold. First the nature of the labor market is dierent, with often a large informal
sector escaping oversight from government agencies. Second, monitoring of beneciaries' eligibility
may be very imperfect (Camacho and Conover, 2011). These concerns are related when eligibility
depends on labor status (Levy, 2008). Because of these specic aspects, costs and benets of a
given program are likely to dier from those in richer countries. Social insurance programs, such as
Unemployment Insurance (UI), trade o welfare gains from providing income support and eciency
costs from distorting behaviors. On the one hand, with the possibility to work informally, a weak
capacity to monitor eligibility status may reduce the need for income support of the average UI
beneciary. On the other hand, it may exacerbate behavioral responses to the program's incentives
and increase eciency costs if potential beneciaries are more willing and better able to adjust
their eligibility status.3 Whether this precludes specic programs to be welfare{enhancing is an
empirical question that crucially depends on credible estimates of eciency costs.
We focus on UI for two reasons. First, UI has been adopted (Figure 1) and is on the agenda in
a growing number of countries sharing with Brazil widespread informal employment and dicult
monitoring of individuals' labor status.4 Yet there is little empirical evidence on costs and benets
of UI in such contexts. Second, recent work on optimal social insurance has revived normative tests
to assess welfare consequences from providing UI (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006 and 2008). Those tests
rely on estimating particular sucient statistics (Chetty, 2009). Among existing social insurance
programs, UI is therefore particularly well{suited for our purpose because there exists a framework
connecting empirical and welfare analysis.
1The exact timing of expansions of social programs is probably related to political economy considerations: the rst
Unemployment Insurance law in Brazil, for example, was enacted one year after the end of the military dictatorship.
2For the Mexican health care program Seguro Popular only: Azuara and Marinescu, 2011; Barros, 2008; Campos{
Vasquez and Knox, 2008; Bosch et al., 2010; Aterido et al., 2011
3\The lack of appropriate administrative capacity to eectively monitor continuing eligibility (...) implies that
the moral hazard problem (...) could be particularly prominent." (Vodopivec, 2008)
4Currently some form of UI exists in Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran,
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam (see Vodopivec, 2009, and Vel asquez, 2010). Recently Mexico, the Philip-
pines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand considered its introduction.
1In this paper, we investigate impacts of UI extensions on program and labor market outcomes
in Brazil. In particular, we estimate a measure of eciency costs directly derived from a normative
framework. To do so, we use matched longitudinal employee{employer data covering the universe
of formal employment (the sector monitored by the UI agency) and two complementary empirical
exercises that are based on credible identication strategies (described below). We then use our
results and available survey data to evaluate welfare eects from UI extensions in a context of
imperfect monitoring of beneciaries' labor status.
More specically, we proceed in four steps. First, we adapt a typical normative framework from
the literature (Chetty, 2006; Kroft, 2008; Schmieder et al, 2011) which highlights the trade{o
between eciency costs from distorting behaviors and social gains from providing income support.
A UI extension aects UI costs by increasing mean covered duration, the actual duration of benet
collection, through: (i) a mechanical eect, as extra benets are oered to UI exhaustees, and (ii)
a behavioral eect, as incentives to nd a job are reduced. The share of the increase due to the
behavioral eect is a relative measure of eciency costs as behavioral responses increase UI costs but
have no rst{order eects on individuals' utility (envelope argument). The mechanical eect is the
potential source of welfare gains as it transfers income without distorting reemployment behavior.
How large those gains are depends on the social value of such a transfer. To evaluate whether a UI
extension (and thus the existing program) increases welfare, we must (i) recover estimates of both
the mechanical and the behavioral eects and (ii) discuss the social value of transferring income to
UI exhaustees.
Second, we turn to the matched employee{employer data to estimate program and labor market
outcomes from UI extensions in Brazil, in particular the mechanical and behavioral eects. We nd
that the hazard of reemployment in the formal sector more than doubles after benet exhaustion
for workers eligible for 5 months of benets, a large spike not observed in richer countries (Card et
al., 2007). A politically{motivated temporary UI extension provides us with an ideal experiment
to study the impact of maximum benet duration on this spike in formal reemployment. Indeed
our sample of workers learned about the extension shortly before exhausting regular benets. To
estimate behavioral responses to UI extensions earlier in the unemployment spell (anticipation
behavior), we also exploit a tenure{based discontinuity.
We nd large percentage reductions in hazard rates of formal reemployment when benets
are extended. In particular, the spike at benet exhaustion is entirely due to the UI program.
We also nd evidence that individuals are forward{looking and adjust their behavior early in the
unemployment spell. However, because monthly hazard rates of formal reemployment are very
low even after benet exhaustion (below 10%), the behavioral eect amounts to only 5%{11% of
the total increase in mean covered duration.5 Contrary to a prior that imperfect monitoring may
5High survival rates outside the formal sector also imply that providing UI in Brazil is costly as most beneciaries
exhaust their benets.
2exacerbate behavioral responses, UI appears to have little impact on formal reemployment and
eciency costs are actually low (the same statistic is estimated at 57% for the US | Katz and
Meyer, 1990).
Our ndings are actually consistent with predominant views on the prevalence of informal
employment. Indeed, reemployment rates in the formal sector could be low if either formal jobs are
more dicult to secure (Fields, 1975) or informal employment is more attractive (Maloney, 1999).
If eciency costs are low, the social value of providing income support to UI exhaustees need not
be as high for a UI extension to increase welfare.6 However, this social value is likely to depend on
the reason why formal reemployment rates are so low. Indeed, the need for income support may
be small if most beneciaries are working informally while collecting benets. In a third step, we
rely on available longitudinal labor force surveys to investigate these aspects. Using a maximum
likelihood estimation adapted to the sampling of the surveys, we estimate that about 35% of our
sample of formal job losers is unemployed at benet exhaustion, a gure comparable to the US.
Therefore a signicant number of formal job losers is actually unemployed at benet exhaustion,
although some UI exhaustees are likely to be working in jobs undetected by the UI agency. We
also document large disposable income gaps between formally employed individuals and formal job
losers at benet exhaustion.
Finally, we use our results and evaluate welfare eects from a UI extension. First, we bound
the social value of providing insurance to UI exhaustees consistent with an increase in welfare.
This social value is small (in absolute terms and using the US as benchmark) because of the low
eciency costs. As many UI exhaustees are unemployed, the result holds even if we adopt the strong
assumption that there is no gain from transferring income to informally reemployed UI exhaustees.
Following Baily (1978), we then impose some structure on the social value such that it depends on
relative risk aversion () and the disposable income gaps we estimated. We then simulate welfare
eects for typical values of . A marginal UI extension increases welfare for the whole range of
values considered and the gains can be sizeable, even if we apply the same assumption as above.
Our normative approach follows the literature on optimal unemployment insurance by consid-
ering a single policy instrument|maximum benet duration. We also abstract from the impact of
UI extensions on layo rates, as experience{rating of benets is the usual prescription to prevent
responses at the layo margin. We further discuss how several mechanisms, absent from our analy-
sis and potentially important in developing countries, may aect our welfare results. Nevertheless,
our analysis indicates that a UI program may increase welfare even in the presence of informal
employment and imperfect monitoring of UI beneciaries' labor status.
In our empirical analysis, we also investigate impacts of UI extensions beyond the maximum
benet duration by following workers for up to 2 years after layo. We estimate that extending
6The same argument applies to recessions (Schmieder et al., 2011): in recessions, reemployment rates are lower
and the behavioral eect is smaller compared to the mechanical eect, increasing welfare eects from extending UI.
3UI increases the duration between two formal jobs, and reduces the time spent formally employed.
However, it also reduces the share of individuals experiencing a new layo from the formal sector.
A typical UI program taxes eligible individuals while working to provide benets upon layo.
Revenues thus depend on average formal employment duration before layo. Our estimates imply
that extending UI would have no eect on this measure in subsequent periods.7 We nally consider
measures of job quality but do not nd systematic eects on job{matching.
Our paper contributes to three main strands in the literature. First, we contribute to the
empirical literature on unemployment insurance by studying the impact of UI extensions in a
dierent context. We are aware of only a few working papers, developed in parallel to our work,
which attempt to causally estimate the impact of UI on some labor market outcomes in non{OECD
countries.8 To our knowledge, we are the rst to estimate the impact of UI on mean covered
duration and UI costs. We are also the rst to causally estimate the impact of UI on a spike in
reemployment at benet exhaustion. Second, we contribute to the empirical literature on optimal
unemployment insurance by showing that a UI program may increase welfare even if monitoring of
UI beneciaries' labor status is very imperfect. Informal employment is not limited to developing
countries, but it is there more prevalent (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Finally, our paper contributes
to the literature on the impact of social insurance and transfer programs in middle{income and
developing countries. As mentioned above, the prevalence of informal employment and imperfect
monitoring of beneciaries' eligibility status have been a central theme in this literature (Levy,
2008). We are the rst paper that uses a cost{benet framework to guide our empirical analysis of
program and labor market outcomes, in particular the estimation of a direct measure of eciency
costs, and to evaluate welfare eects of a social insurance program in this context. We consider
such an approach essential as many countries considering adopting or extending social insurance
programs share similar characteristics and policy should be based on empirical results interpretable
in terms of eciency costs and welfare.
Our ndings also relate to the literature on labor markets in developing countries. The tradi-
tional view considered informal and formal jobs as segmented labor markets (Fields, 1975). Re-
cent work argues that informal employment may be voluntary (Maloney, 1999). Our normative
framework does not rely on a specic view of the labor market. We acknowledge that informal
employment may be voluntary and bound our welfare eects by assuming that welfare gains from
providing income support to the informally reemployed are nil. A few papers in this literature
investigate the impact of UI in macro models of the labor market (Zenou, 2008; Ulyssea, 2010) but
their modeling of the incentives created by UI is often coarse. Another literature investigates the
consequence of employment shocks in developing countries (Chetty and Looney, 2006 and 2007)
7Contrary to the models used in Chetty (2008) and Schmieder et al. (2011).
8See IADB (in progress) for example. We are aware of 3 working papers on UI in Brazil but they are mostly
descriptive (Cunningham, 2000; Margolis, 2008; Hijzen, 2011).
4stressing the potential benets of insurance programs as it appears more dicult for households
to smooth consumption in developing countries. We complement this literature by estimating the
costs of providing insurance and by combining both costs and benets to evaluate welfare eects.
Finally, our paper is part of a small but growing literature at the intersection of Development
Economics and Public Finance (Gordon and Li, 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 adapts a framework to discuss costs and
benets of UI and evaluate welfare eects from UI extensions. Section 3 provides some background
and describes the Brazilian UI program and our data. Section 4 turns to the data by rst recovering
formal reemployment survival and hazard rates for potential UI beneciaries. We then exploit two
complementary empirical strategies to study the impact of UI extensions on program and labor
market outcomes, and their eciency costs. Section 5 investigates the insurance role of UI using
survey data. Section 6 uses our results to evaluate welfare eects. Section 7 concludes.
2 Cost and Benets of a UI program
This section introduces a framework adapted from the optimal UI literature (Baily, 1978; Chetty,
2006 and 2008; Kroft, 2008; Schmieder et al., 2011). We start from a typical budget equation
and decompose the impact of UI extensions on UI costs into: (i) a mechanical eect, as additional
benets are now oered to UI exhaustees, and (ii) a behavioral eect, as incentives to nd a job are
reduced. We then derive a sucient statistics formula (Chetty, 2009) to evaluate welfare eects.
In this framework, the relative size of the behavioral eect is a measure of eciency costs (envelope
argument). This welfare decomposition guides our subsequent empirical analysis: it requires us to
(i) recover estimates of both the mechanical and the behavioral eects and (ii) discuss the social
value of transferring income to UI exhaustees. Our framework is consistent with a job{search model
with formal and informal employment opportunities (see Appendix). However, it does not rely on
a specic model of the labor market.
1. Budget equation. A typical UI program taxes working eligible individuals to provide benets
upon layo for a limited period. A budget{balanced UI program with replacement rate r = b
wF (b,
UI benets; wF, formal wage) and maximum benet duration of P periods must satisfy:
DFwF = DBrwF (1)
where  is the tax levied on formal wage wF, DF is the average duration of formal employment
before layo, and DB is mean covered duration, the average duration of actual benet collection.
The right{hand side in (1) is average costs and the left{hand side average revenues per UI spell.
Lower reemployment rates in jobs monitored by the UI agency increase mean covered duration,
UI costs, and the necessary tax rate. High layo rates reduce formal employment duration before
layo, reduce UI revenues, and increase the necessary tax rate.
52. Cost of extending UI. An extension in maximum benet duration P increases mean covered
duration, and UI costs, through: (i) a mechanical eect, as additional benets are now oered to UI
exhaustees, and (ii) a behavioral eect,9 as incentives to nd a job are reduced. Those two eects
are decomposed in Figure 2. Illustrative survival functions out of the formal sector are drawn for
a maximum benet duration of 4 and 5 months (P = 4;5). Higher survival rates when benets
are extended capture the reduced incentives to nd a formal job. The black area corresponds to
mean covered duration (DB) before the UI extension. The mechanical eect corresponds to the
white area: individuals surviving out of the formal sector after benet exhaustion would collect
the additional benet even if they do not change their behavior. The grey area corresponds to the
behavioral eect, the change in mean covered duration due to behavioral responses.


























where the rst term in brackets is the mechanical eect and the second term the behavioral eect.
Equation (2) assumes that UI benets are suciently experience{rated. This is a common as-
sumption in the literature because experience rating is the usual normative prescription to prevent
responses of layo rates and formal employment duration to UI.10 Equation (2) also assumes that
average duration of formal employment before layo is not aected by the impact of UI extensions
on the duration out of the formal sector. Such a channel matters in models where individuals con-
tribute to the UI system upon reemployment but new jobs are never lost (Chetty, 2008; Schmieder
et al., 2011). In practice, layo risk upon reemployment is not nil. Duration out of the formal sector
aects the overall time a worker spends in the formal sector but it does not aect average duration
of formal employment before layo (and average UI revenues) if the layo rate is unchanged.11
How would UI costs compare in countries with widespread informal employment and imperfect
monitoring of beneciaries' labor status? Reemployment rates in the formal sector are likely to be
lower and behavioral responses smaller if either formal jobs are dicult to secure (Fields, 1975)
or informal jobs are relatively attractive (Maloney, 1999), as derived in a job{search model in
the Appendix. Extending benets would then be costly, mostly through the mechanical eect.
Behavioral responses could be larger if the formality of a given reemployment status is easily
adjusted: imperfect monitoring may allow individuals to hide new formal jobs while collecting UI,
9The relevant eects are at the macro level. As most empirical variation is at the micro level, estimates give an
upper bound in the presence of search externalities (see Landais et al., 2011).
10We nd suggestive evidence that layo rates may respond to UI eligibility in Brazil. Yet, existing institutions
appear sucient to prevent such responses for the sample of workers we consider.
11In an innite horizon model with 2 states (employment{unemployment) and constant transition probabilities, a
decrease in the probability to leave unemployment reduces equilibrium employment but also the number of transitions
to unemployment (layo) as the latter is proportional to the former. Employment duration before layo is unaected.
6as revealed by a lot of anecdotal evidence in Brazil.12 Moreover, potentially large income eects in
poorer countries (Chetty and Looney, 2006 and 2007) would predict high reemployment rates and a
large behavioral response. Because of this ambiguity, our paper addresses the question empirically.
3. Welfare eects of extending benets. Adopting a welfarist approach and assuming agents
behave optimally, we can derive a sucient statistics formula to evaluate welfare eects from
UI extensions, taking the rest of the environment as given. Welfare gains from extending benets
result from the additional benet rwF collected by individuals if they do not change their behavior,
corresponding to the mechanical eect|S(P). If we dene gU
P as the social marginal welfare weight
on UI exhaustees, the social value of giving $1 to the average UI exhaustee, we have:
dWG = gU
PS(P)rwF
Welfare losses from extending UI result from the tax increase necessary to balance the UI
budget. Let's dene gE as the social marginal welfare weight on contributing individuals, typically
the social value of giving $1 to the average formal worker. As formal workers spend on average DF
periods contributing before collecting benets, we have that:












The average welfare eect (per UI spell) of extending UI is the sum of gains and losses. We can
divide each term by ge to express welfare in a money metrics (Chetty, 2008). To obtain a formula
for the aggregate welfare eects, we multiply by the number of layos in a given period divided
by total formal payroll over the period (or
q
wF , with q the layo rate). Welfare eects are then
expressed as a percentage increase in total formal payroll.
df W =
q




















The share of the cost increase due to the behavioral is a relative measure of eciency costs and
enters negatively in (3): the behavioral eect increases UI spendings but has no rst{order eect
on the welfare of UI beneciaries (envelope argument). The mechanical eect enters positively as it
12Our favorite quote from Yahoo Answers! found on March 3rd, 2011.
Q: I am starting in a new rm (...) and there are 5 days left to receive the other month of my unemployment
insurance. If I am registered before I get my next payment do I lose the UI this month? (...)
R: In general, when receiving unemployment insurance benets, employees talk to the employer asking to sign the
working card after receiving all UI payments, as a \favor". Most rms agree without any problem. Some do not,
fearing that the Labor Ministry nds out - nes for an unregistered worker are huge. Talk to your boss and say:
\Look, I would like to negotiate with you, Sir, about registering my working card. The thing is that I still have the
last month of my UI to receive on day \X" and I would not like to miss it. Would you mind registering my card after
that date?" My sister and my friends already have done this a lot... they never faced any problem. (...) This is so
common nowadays.
7corresponds to a non{distortionary income transfer from contributing individuals to UI exhaustees.
The social value of such a transfer is captured by
gU
P  gE
gE . We can estimate every element of (3),
besides the social value. As in other sucient statistics formula, those elements are not deep
structural parameters independent of each other. For example, large income eects lead to large
behavioral responses but also reveal a high social value of insuring UI exhaustees (Chetty, 2008).
Nevertheless the formula can be used as a local empirical test around the existing UI program:
df W > 0 implies that a marginal UI extension, and the existing UI program, increases welfare.
To evaluate welfare eects in this framework, we must (i) estimate both the mechanical and the
behavioral eect, what we do in Section 4, and (ii) discuss the social value of transferring income
to UI exhaustees. Given an estimate of eciency costs, we can bound the social value consistent
with an increase in welfare and simulate welfare eects for specic social values, using (3). To
make further progress, we exploit longitudinal labor force survey data in Section 5 to estimate the
share of UI exhaustees actually unemployed, O(P). Indeed, if most UI exhaustees are voluntarily
reemployed in jobs undetected by the UI agency, the need for income support may be limited. We
then decompose social value and mechanical eect as:





























P the social marginal welfare weight on unemployed and informally reemployed UI
exhaustee and I(P) the share of individuals still informally reemployed after benet exhaustion.
Using (4), we can impose the strong assumption that there is no gain from transferring income
to informally reemployed UI exhaustees and recover a new bound on the social value of insuring
unemployed UI exhaustees consistent with df W > 0. There is no clear prediction as to how this
social value would compare in poorer countries, not mentioning the fundamental subjectivity it
encloses. Individuals may particularly benet from insurance schemes if smoothing consumption
is more dicult in poorer countries (Chetty and Looney, 2006 and 2007). Higher costs of taxing
formal workers in developing countries |even for benet taxes (Levy 2008), can be captured by a
higher value of $1 to contributing individuals (ge). In least developed settings, formal jobs may be
so rare and short{lived that workers do not value insurance.
Finally, we can follow Baily (1978) and assume a social welfare function with equal Pareto







with consumption levels c and  the coecient of relative risk aversion. In section 5, we esti-
mate disposable income gaps between UI exhaustees and the formally employed to approximate
consumption gaps. We can then simulate welfare eects for dierent values of .
Our cost{benet framework abstracts from several dimensions that we cannot address empir-
ically. First, this is a partial equilibrium analysis: the envelope argument is not sucient, for
8example, in the presence of search frictions and wage bargaining. Search frictions may be partic-
ularly large in labor markets with a large informal sector (Ulyssea, 2010). Landais et al. (2011)
extends the analysis to incorporate such general equilibrium considerations and obtain that welfare
eects from UI are likely to be larger. Three additional remarks deserve our attention:
A. Longer{term impacts. Extending UI may improve welfare through subsequent job quality.
We investigate this channel empirically in Section 4 but we nd no systematic impact.
B. Informality as externality. The impact of UI extensions on informal employment does not
aect welfare directly when behavioral responses have only second{order eects. Informal employ-
ment might generate negative externalities (Gordon and Li, 2005; Levy, 2008) and therefore the
impact of UI extensions on informal employment may be rst-order (in the Appendix, we derive
a welfare formula allowing for an externality). The sign of such an impact is ambiguous (see be-
low). Therefore, it is unknown a priori if UI may exacerbate or mitigate a potential externality.
Extending UI may also attract informal workers to the formal sector. If those new workers face
higher layo rates or smaller reemployment rates than average, it will create scal externalities.13
Instead, extending UI may push workers away from the formal sector because of the (benet) tax
increase necessary to nance such an extension (Levy, 2008).
C. Informality, moral hazard and income eects. The recent literature on optimal UI focuses
on disentangling substitution (moral hazard) and income (liquidity) eects (Chetty, 2008). Both
substitution and income eects reduce formal reemployment rates. Therefore the sign of the impact
of UI extensions on formal reemployment rates is uninformative. However, the substitution eect
pushes individuals towards informal employment. Therefore, a negative impact of UI extensions
on informal reemployment rates would reveal that any substitution eect is dominated by a larger
income eect (if negative). This is derived in the Appendix. To our knowledge, existing data are
not rich enough to tackle such a question, at least in Latin America: samples are too small, panels
are too short, and little eort is devoted to UI programs.14
3 Institutions, Data and Background
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we describe here the Brazilian UI program and our data
as well as relevant background information on the Brazilian labor market.
13Importantly, informal workers newly attracted to the formal sector must be dierent in such a way as the mere
impact of attracting additional workers to the formal labor force would not aect the UI budget equation.
14Currently, monthly survey data in Brazil do not ask about UI benets and information about previous jobs are
only collected for the unemployed. In Argentina a question about UI benets is only asked to unemployed workers.
93.1 Institutions
A. The Brazilian UI program
Contrary to other developing countries, Brazil has an experience of more than 20 years with UI
and a sizeable UI program. From 1995 to 2002, on average per year, the program provided benets
to 4.5 million new beneciaries and 19.9 million UI checks were issued. Total benet payments
amounted to 2.5% of the total payroll of eligible workers, more than three times the corresponding
US gure. UI is available for workers from the private sector15 who are (i) red without a justied
reason, (ii) with at least 6 months of formal work prior to dismissal, and (iii) with no other form of
labor income. In practice, the last condition is only enforced if reemployed as a formal employee.
Each month, applications are compared to a database tracking hiring and layos as reported by
rms on a monthly basis (CAGED). Benets are granted for a month if individuals do not reappear
in the data.16 Due to little incentives to timely report hirings, this database has a coverage 15%
smaller than the data we use, reported yearly (Minist erio do Trabalho e Emprego, 2008).
There is a 30{day waiting period before a rst UI payment can be collected. Maximum ben-
et duration depends on the number of months of formal employment in the 36 months prior to
dismissal, T36|3 months of UI if T36 2 [6;12), 4 months of UI if T36 2 [12;24) and 5 months of
UI if T36  24. The replacement rate is constant until exhaustion of benets and is means{tested,
starting at 80% at the bottom of the wage distribution.17 Benets can be used discontinuously
over a period of 16 months after which a worker is again eligible for the full maximum benet du-
ration. This complicates assessment of eligibility for a given worker in our data. Finally, Brazil is
uncommon in the sense that UI is nanced through rms' payments of a .65% tax on total sales.18
B. Job protection institutions
Other institutions in Brazil are aimed at protecting formal employees from labor demand shocks.
Severance payment accounts. Employers must deposit 8% of a worker's monthly wage in a severance
payment account (FGTS). Employees can usually only access the account upon layo or retirement.
In case of layo, employers must pay a ne equivalent to 50% of the amount deposited.
Advance notice of layo. The rst 3 months of employment are considered a probationary period
in Brazil. Employers laying o workers with more than 3 months of tenure must provide a worker
with a 1{month advance notice. During this month, wages cannot be reduced and employers must
allow a worker up to 2 hours a day to look for a new job.
Mediation meeting. Any layo of workers with more than 12 months of tenure must be signed by
15Any formal worker must have their \working card" signed by their employer. In Brazil, the denition of the
formal sector is thus somewhat clearer than in other countries.
16Since 1990, on average, more than 98% of applications are successful (Minist erio do Trabalho e Emprego, 2010).
17The complete schedule is presented in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
18If UI is nanced through a sales tax, the social marginal welfare weight on contributing individuals is the social
value of $1 for the average consumer of formal goods rather than the average formal worker. It is unclear how those
compare. In theory, they should be equal if governments equalize the marginal cost of public funds across sources.
10a representative of the Labor Ministry (or the Unions) who veries workers received all payments
they were entitled to. This increases oversight over the layo process and constitutes a signicant
administrative burden, as ocials are unable to visit every worksite each month.
3.2 Data
A. Matched employee{employer data (RAIS)
Our main data, RAIS (Rela c~ ao Anual de Informa c~ oes Sociais), is derived from Brazil's labor force
records gathered annually by the Labor Ministry. RAIS is a longitudinal linked employee{employer
dataset covering by law the universe of formally employed workers. It includes public sector em-
ployees but by design misses employers, informal workers, and the self{employed. All tax-registered
rms have to report every worker formally employed at some point during the previous calendar
year. RAIS' main purpose is to administer a federal wage supplement (Abono Salarial) oering
the equivalent of a monthly minimum wage to low{wage workers formally employed during the
calendar year. There are thus incentives for truthful reporting. RAIS has also been increasingly
used by ministries administrating other programs |UI or conditional cash transfers| to monitor
formal job take-ups. There are (rarely issued) nes for rms that fail to report. The Labor Min-
istry estimates that information on more than 90% of formal workers were reported throughout
the 1990s (Muendler, 2008). Moreover, RAIS has a better coverage than the data used by the UI
agency to monitor beneciaries' labor status. We can currently access RAIS data from 1994 to
2002, although the 1994 data does not identify the reason for separation. In that period, RAIS
covers more than 30 million formal workers a year.
Every observation in RAIS is a worker{establishment pair in a given year. Workers, rms and
establishments are uniquely identied over time and geographical areas. Every observation includes
the following variables: (i) hiring and separation months and reason for separation; (ii) average
monthly earnings and December earnings; (iii) sector (2 and 3 digits) codes; (iv) tenure when
an employment relationship ends and as of December 31st (ex: tenure=6.1 months); (v) location
of the establishment (municipality); (vi) contract type, contracted hours and legal form of the
establishment; (vii) education, age, gender and nationality. The Appendix details how we use the
data to recover duration between two formal jobs.
Not having access to actual UI records, we can only precisely assess UI eligibility for the subsam-
ple of workers with indeterminate{length contracts, more than 24 months of tenure in the lost job
and recorded as involuntarily laid o.19 We also restrict our attention to private sector employees,
as public employees are not eligible. Those workers are eligible for 5 months of UI benets. Any
19Individuals with less than 24 months of tenure might be eligible for 5 months of UI instead of 4 if they accumulated
tenure in a previous job without collecting benets in between. Individuals with less than 16 months of tenure might
not be eligible at all if they collected benets before starting in this job.
11impact estimated captures Intention{To{Treat as we do not observe the actual take{up of UI.20
Workers with more than 24 months of tenure are clearly selected but are also more likely to value
UI as they have adjusted their expectations to being formally employed.
B. Urban labor force surveys (PME)
Brazilian urban labor force surveys (PME, 2003{2010) have the same structure as the CPS. House-
holds enter the sample for 2 periods of 4 consecutive months (interviewed in the same week of the
month) 8 months apart from each other. PME covers the six largest urban areas of Brazil and is
used to compute ocial unemployment rates in Brazil. Each survey asks for labor market status of
every household member above 10 years old, information on monthly wage and tenure in the job.
A specic question asks if the respondent's working card was signed by her employer in the current
job, a denition of formality in Brazil and a condition to appear in RAIS. Moreover, individuals
who do not report any employment are asked about their labor status and tenure in the last job,
the reason for separation and the length of their non{employment spell.21
3.3 Background
A. Informality prevalent.
As in many developing countries, a large share of the labor force in Brazil is working as self{employed
(mostly undeclared) or informal employees. From 2003{2010, only 55% of working male 18{54 years
old were formal employees. This pattern holds broadly across demographic groups (70% of working
male young college graduates are formal employees |own calculations using PME). Firms in our
data are also likely to employ unregistered workers. Fines for doing so are high (about 2.6 minimum
wages) but the risk of detection is very low (Cardoso and Lage, 2007). According to the 2002 World
Bank's Investment Climate survey in Brazilian manufacturing, only 70% of rms with more than
100 employees and 35% of rms with less than 20 employees were inspected at least once in the
previous year. Asked about the share of unregistered workers a similar rm would employ, the
same survey reveals a median answer of 30% for small rms (own calculations).
B. Formal jobs short{lived.
20There is no available take{up statistics. If we divide the number of new beneciaries by the number of eligible
layos with more than 6 months of tenure in the previous month in RAIS, we obtain a gure close to 95%. Very
few UI beneciaries have less than 6 months of tenure in their previous job according to ocial statistics (Marinho,
2010). Such an exercise is only suggestive but others estimate similarly high take{up rates (Hijzen, 2011). From
Section 2, the mechanical eect corresponds to S(P), the share of job losers surviving outside the formal sector up
to period P. If take{up was only 0 < M < 1, then the relevant mechanical eect would be MS
M(P) where S
M(P) is
the share of UI takers surviving outside the formal sector up to period P. We expect S
M(P) > S(P), therefore given
the likely high take{up, any bias is probably very small. We have no way to estimate S
M(P) directly. Moreover,
non{takers are likely to value insurance less. Therefore, if the mechanical eect may be smaller in the presence of
imperfect take{up, the social value of providing UI is likely to be higher and the eect on welfare is thus ambiguous.
21Labor force surveys were greatly improved in 2002.
12Private formal jobs tend to be less stable in poorer countries.22 Tenure levels are lower, separa-
tion rates higher and layo rates much higher in Brazil than in the US.23 Most formal workers in
Brazil are young with low levels of education and tenure, a population associated with less stable
employment (Maloney, 2003). Goods and services produced in the formal sector are also likely to
face more volatile (mainly foreign) demand in developing countries. In addition, particular insti-
tutions of the labor market |ring costs increasing with tenure and severance payment accounts
only accessible upon layo| may also cause high rates of experimentation on the employer side
and a higher propensity to record a job{separation as a layo (Gonzaga, 2003). We nd suggestive
evidence that layo rates may respond to UI eligibility. Yet, existing institutions appear sucient
to prevent such response for the sample of workers we focus on (see Section 4.3).
4 The Impact of UI extensions
In this section, we use our administrative data to recover hazard rates of formal reemployment
and survival rates outside the formal sector for workers eligible for 5 months of UI. Hazard rates
more than double after benet exhaustion but are generally low. We then estimate the impacts
of UI extensions by exploiting two complementary sources of exogenous variation. We investigate
both program outcomes, in particular the mechanical and behavioral eects of UI extensions, and
longer{term outcomes on formal employment up to 2 years after layo. Finally, we summarize our
results and compare them with existing estimates from the literature.
4.1 Formal reemployment after layo
Using the hiring, separation and tenure information in our data, we can recover formal reemploy-
ment hazard rates, and survival rates out of the formal sector.24 Figure 3a presents monthly formal
reemployment hazard rates for a group of workers eligible for 5 months of UI benets after a wait-
ing period of 30 days following layo. Aggregate hazard rates are higher during the waiting period
(month 0), then much lower when UI benets can be collected. Strikingly, hazard rates more than
double after benet exhaustion (month 5) and stay higher for a few months. This spike suggests
that UI aects job{search behavior, a behavioral eect we estimate in the next section. Moreover,
no such spike is observed for workers ineligible for UI.25 We are the rst to document this pattern
22See Kaplan et al. (2007) and Schaner (2001) for a similar point in Mexico and Colombia, respectively.
2320%{25% of formal male workers have more than 10 years of tenure in Brazil; the corresponding gure is around
35%{40% in the US (own calculations using RAIS and estimates from Farber, 2010). Monthly separation and layo
rates are around 3% and 1.1% in the US, respectively. The corresponding gures in Brazil are 4% for separations
and 3% for layos (own calculations using RAIS and estimates from Davis et al, 2006).
24Codes to construct the duration data are available upon request.
25For example, we nd no such spike for public sector employees, private sector workers with small tenure levels,
and private sector workers laid o for justied reasons (available upon request).
13in Brazil; such a large spike is not observed in typical developed countries.26
However, the behavioral eect is likely to be small compared to the mechanical eect of ex-
tending UI. Indeed, formal reemployment rates as recorded by government agencies are very low in
Brazil. As shown on Figure 3b, 80% of our sample exhaust their 5 months of UI benets. Moreover
only 50% nd a new job as formal employee within the year.27 Such a pattern is mostly unrelated
to UI as low reemployment rates in the formal sector are also observed after benet exhaustion
and for workers ineligible for UI.28 This pattern is not limited to Brazil: in Argentina, 80% of UI
beneciaries eligible for 4 months of UI do exhaust their benets (IADB, in progress).29 Formal
reemployment rates are lower for female, older and less educated workers but are low even for young
male college graduates (not shown). Providing UI in this context is costly but eciency costs are
likely to be small. A signicant share of UI exhaustees may be reemployed in jobs undetected by
the UI agency (something we estimate in Section 5) but UI appear to have little inuence on their
decision to do so.
4.2 A politically{motivated temporary UI extension
In August 1996, a temporary legislation increased maximum benet duration by 2 months in the
existing ocial metropolitan areas30 of Brazil. Additional benets could only be collected between
September 1st and December 31st. This relatively short window of time prevents manipulation of
the pool of workers eligible for the extra benets. In sum, any worker who exhausted her regular
UI benets before November 1996, and was not reemployed in the formal sector, could receive up
to 2 additional months of UI benets. The timeline is illustrated on Figure 4.
Media coverage reveals a clear electoral motive behind the temporary legislation. 1996 was
a local{election year with rounds in October and November. An extension of UI limited to S~ ao
Paulo was proposed to the President on August 14th by Jos e Serra. A former minister, he was
running for mayor of S~ ao Paulo and argued that unemployment was rising. One day later, the
26Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) nd a similar spike in Slovenia. Ferrada (2011) nds some evidence of such a
spike in Chile and IADB (in progress) in Uruguay. Card et al. (2007) reviews the literature in richer countries.
27In this sense, the Brazilian context is very dierent from the Slovenian one analyzed in Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2006). In their sample, similar workers are nearly all securing a formal job within a year.
28Public sector employees, private sector workers with small tenure levels, and private sector workers laid o for
justied reasons (available upon request).
29In China, most beneciaries exhaust their UI benets too (Vodopivec and Tong, 2008). Personal communications
with Eric Verhoogen reveal that in similar administrative Mexican data (IMSS), about 35% of workers aged 36{45
have only spent half of a 12{years window in formal employment.
30(...)the choice of the rst 9 metropolitan regions (in the 1970s) was more related to the objective of developing an
urban system in the country according to the needs of a particular economic development strategy than to contemplating
cities with actual characteristics of metropolitan regions. The proof of this claim was that Santos, Goiania and
Campinas did not become metropolitan regions at that time, despite meeting some of the most important criteria to
be considered a metropolitan area. Guimar~ aes (2004), translation of the authors.
14Labor Minister called a meeting of the board managing the UI fund. At the meeting, the three
worker representatives defended a UI extension for all Brazilian cities, arguing that \unemployment
is increasing everywhere, not only (referring to Serra) where the PSDB candidate is doing badly
(Folha de S~ ao Paulo, August 22nd, 1996)." This proposal was denied because a national extension
would have required Congressional approval, as it would have cost more than the legal threshold
for speedy approvals of UI extensions. An extension restricted to the 9 ocial metropolitan areas
and the Federal district was agreed on as a compromise.
Arguably, the 1996 temporary UI extension was thus politically motivated, unanticipated and its
geographical restriction was not related to local labor market conditions. Nevertheless to reinforce
the exogeneity of our cross{sectional variation, we drop S~ ao Paulo from the sample of analysis.
Unemployment rates were higher in 1996 than in 1995 but not than in 1997. Benets were not
extended in such a way in any other year with higher unemployment rates until 2009. This natural
experiment creates exogenous variation in treatment across periods and geographical areas, calling
for a dierence-in{dierence (di{in{di) strategy. Potentially aected workers learned about the
treatment shortly before regular benet exhaustion. We can thus estimate the causal impact of
maximum benet duration on the spike in formal reemployment at benet exhaustion.
4.2.1 Sample selection
In our matched employee{employer data, we can only precisely assess UI eligibility for workers with
more than 2 years of tenure (see Section 3.2), so we limit our sample to this group. To minimize
information issues and maximize take{up of the extra benets, we also restrict attention to workers
who would have collected their last UI payment in September or October in absence of a temporary
extension. Indeed, those workers could have collected two additional months of benets in 1996
without experiencing any gap in UI payments. We use both 1995 and 1997 as control years. Since
1996, other urban centers have received the status of metropolitan area. We use them as control
group.31 We have 9 treated areas (excluding S~ ao Paulo) and 20 control areas. In short, our sample
includes any worker aged 18 to 54, with more than 2 years of tenure in their lost job (eligible for 5
months of regular UI) who lost a private formal job in April or May 1995, 1996 or 1997.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix present the distribution and composition of our sample
across treatment{control areas and years. We have about 240,000 workers. Treatment areas rep-
resent 70% of the sample as treatment was assigned to larger urban areas. Treatment areas have
a larger service sector, a smaller industrial sector and more college graduates. Average age is also
higher in treatment areas. But those dierences appear in both control and treatment years. About
67% of our sample is male, mean age is 33 years old, education levels are low with nearly half the
31Many urban areas were awarded the status of metropolitan area between 1996 and 2002. Given that the set of mu-
nicipalities composing any given metropolitan area has been modied over the years, we only consider municipalities
that were part of a metropolitan area in 1996 or when the status of metropolitan area was rst granted.
15sample having not completed 8th grade, and mean replacement rates are around 50%.
4.2.2 Graphical evidence
Impacts of the temporary UI extension can be seen graphically. Figure 5 depicts survival rates out
of formal employment. Survival functions in control areas and years trace each other closely, with
survival rates slightly lower in 1995. In 1996, the survival function in treatment areas departs from
the other ones after September. This results in an increase in the survival rate 7 months after layo
(when the last extended benet is collected) of about 6.8 percentage points. Figure 5 supports our
identication strategy: except for the treatment period, trends are similar across years and areas.
Treatment impacts on hazard rates of formal reemployment are visible on Figure 6. In 1996,
the spike around regular benets exhaustion32 disappears in treatment areas. Hazard rates are
lower until extended benets are exhausted. The spike is thus entirely due to the UI program.
We estimate below aggregate formal reemployment rates to be 50% lower in the 2 months between
exhaustion of regular and extended benets. Using the sample of workers laid o in May (who
learned about the extension at least one month before exhausting their regular benets), we can
estimate reductions in reemployment rates in anticipation of the additional benets. In month 4
after layo, their reemployment rate is 19% lower on average in our preferred specication. In the
Appendix, we present additional graphical evidence and some robustness checks. In particular, a
similar shift in formal reemployment hazard rates is also visible for temporary layos but not for
a similar sample of workers laid o later in the same years or laid o in the same months in the
next local{election year. Moreover, hazard rates of formal reemployment six months after layo
(the spike) in each metropolitan area in control and treatment years are only statistically dierent
from each other in treatment areas and they are so in every one of them. Our treatment impact
is not confounded with labor market size as one treatment (resp. control) area |Bel em (resp.
Campinas)| was smaller (resp. larger) than some control (resp. treatment) areas.33
4.2.3 Benet collection outcomes
We display regression results for three sets of benet collection outcomes in Table 1: (i) survival
rates 5 and 7 months after layo corresponding to collection of the last regular and the last ex-
tended benets (S5;S7), (ii) mean covered duration for regular UI benets conditional on take{up
(
P
t=1:::5 St=S1) and mean covered duration of the 2 extended UI payments conditional on exhaus-
tion of regular benets (
P
t=6:::7 St=S5), and (iii) aggregate monthly reemployment hazard rates
between exhaustion of regular and extended benets (h5;h6) for the whole sample and also prior
to regular benet exhaustion (h4) for the May sample.
32Due to the 30{days waiting period, individuals who survive until month 5 after layo, collect their last UI payment
at the beginning of that month.
33Figures A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5, respectively.
16For the rst two sets of outcomes, we estimate the following OLS specications for individual
i, in metropolitan area m and year t:
yi;m;t = m + Y ear1996t +  [Y ear1996t  TreatAream] + Xi;m;t + i;m;t (6)
where m is a metropolitan area xed eect and Xi;m;t is a full set of exible controls for age, tenure,
log wages, education, sector and gender.  captures a di{in{di estimate for a given outcome y
and is reported in Table 1. i;m;t is an individual error term.




= m + Y ear1996t +  [Y ear1996t  TreatAream] + Xi;m;t + i;m;t (7)
where h is an indicator for being reemployed in the month considered (4th, 5th or 6th month since
layo) if not formally reemployed before then. i;m;t is an individual error term.
We present specications varying the control years and the set of controls, and we cluster stan-
dard errors by metropolitan areas. Table 1 reveals that 67% of the sample is still out of formal
employment 7 months after layo in control areas in 1996. Using both control years and the full
set of controls, we estimate an increase of about 6.8 percentage points due to the temporary exten-
sion. If two additional UI payments had been oered in control areas in 1996, the average worker
exhausting regular UI benets would have mechanically collected 1.75 additional UI payments. We
estimate an increase of about .12 additional UI payments in response to the temporary extension.
The behavioral eect thus amounts to less than 7% of the increase in mean covered duration. Those
estimates are very robust across specications and highly signicant. Because workers learned late
about the temporary extension, we nd no signicant eect on exhaustion of (or mean covered
duration for) regular UI benets.
Estimates from our hazard model are also very robust and signicant across specications. We
estimate a percentage reduction in aggregate hazard rates of about 52%{54.5% (baseline .07{.0892)
when additional benets can be collected.35 Additionally for the sample of workers laid o in May,
we estimate reductions in aggregate hazard rates in month 4 |in anticipation of any extended
benet| of about 18.7% (baseline .04). This latter estimate is larger when using 1995 (24%) and
lower when using 1997 (10%) as control years. Our estimates of the behavioral eect are thus
lower{bounds as individuals could not adjust behavior directly upon layo. Our second empirical
strategy allows us to recover such anticipated responses.
In the Appendix, we replicated these results (i) collapsing data at the area{month level,36 (ii)
through a triple{dierence strategy including workers laid o in July, August and September in
the same years and the same areas, and (iii) limiting our sample to workers with replacement rates
34They are equivalent to standard proportional hazard models when hazard rates are low as in Brazil.
35Because baseline rates are low, we can approximate percentage changes as 1   exp().
36We have very unbalanced clusters.
17above 50% as they have more incentives to collect UI benets. Results are very similar: estimated
impacts are slightly larger when collapsing the data or restricting the sample to individuals with
higher replacement rates but are smaller with the triple{dierence strategy (Table A.3). Performing
our OLS specications separately for dierent categories of workers also reveal that the temporary
extension had an eect for each category (gender, age, education, sector). Estimates are smaller
for older and more educated workers (Table A.4).
4.2.4 Reemployment outcomes
We present results on longer{term reemployment outcomes applying the same OLS specications
in Table 2. The rst 3 columns show results for the whole sample and the last 3 columns for the
sample of workers potentially aected by the UI extension (not reemployed by September).
As seen on Figure 5, survival rates in treatment areas in 1996 did not catch up immediately
with survival rates in control years after exhaustion of the additional benets. Moreover survival
rates in control areas in 1996 decrease faster in later months than survival rates in control years.
Therefore, we estimate very signicant longer{term impacts of the temporary extension on the
sample of aected workers.37 Restricting attention to the 2 years following layo, we estimate a
1.86 percentage point decrease in the share ever formally reemployed (baseline 63%), a .70 month
increase in the duration out of formal employment (baseline 13.65 months), and a .47 month
decrease in the number of months of formal employment in the 2 years following layo (baseline
8.06 months, column 4). Given that workers must be formally reemployed to be laid o again
from the formal sector, we also estimate a decrease of about 1.71 percentage point in the share of
workers experiencing at least one new layo. Our estimates imply a positive impact of .0652 month
on the subsequent average duration of formal employment before layo (corresponding to DF in
our model), using our preferred specication (column 4).38 Therefore, at least when layo risk is
high, there is no evidence that UI extensions decrease average contributions to the UI budget per
UI spell.39 Finally, we nd no evidence of an impact on log real wage if employed in December
31st, 2 years after layo.40
4.3 Tenure{based discontinuities in UI eligibility
Because workers learned late about the temporary UI extensions, the empirical strategy above
does not allow us to estimate impacts of UI extensions on formal reemployment rates directly upon
layo. To estimate such anticipation behaviors, we turn to a second empirical strategy.
37We interpret these results with caution as the common{trend assumption is a stronger assumption in the long{run.





39Results collapsing data at the area{month level, adopting a triple dierence strategy or restricting the sample to
workers with replacement rates above 50% are very similar and available upon request.
40We also found no evidence of an impact on other characteristics of the rst new job (available upon request).
18Tenure{based discontinuities in maximum benet duration in Brazil potentially provides us
with a regression discontinuity design. A necessary condition for such an identication strategy
to be valid is that the forcing variable (tenure at layo) must be continuously distributed across
the relevant tenure threshold (6, 12 and 24 months of tenure). As shown in Figure 7, this tenure
density is not continuous and varies systematically with some institutions of the labor market. In
particular, it is not continuous across the rst 2 relevant tenure thresholds for UI eligibility (6
and 12 months). The upward jump in the density at the 6{month threshold might be due to the
absence of experience rating of UI benets in Brazil: UI eligibility gives employees and employers
a surplus to negotiate over in case of layo.41 The discontinuity around the 12{month threshold
cannot be due to the increase in UI benets a worker is now eligible for. Indeed, the layo density
jumps downward. In Brazil, ring costs are discontinuously increased at 3 months of tenure (end of
probationary period) and 12 months of tenure (administrative burden and oversight over the layo
process). Firms clearly react to changes in ring costs by adjusting their layo decisions. We can
apparently exploit (veried below) the 24{month tenure threshold as the tenure density at layo
is continuous beyond 1 year of tenure. The higher ring costs that rms are facing at those tenure
levels, the higher value of such jobs for workers and the additional scrutiny over the layo process
may be sucient to prevent responses on the layo margin even in the absence of experience rating.
4.3.1 Sample selection
Although we have information on the whole history of formal employment starting in 1994, we do
not observe if a worker collected UI benets in the past and we can thus only imperfectly assess
eligibility for workers with less than 2 years of tenure (see Section 3.2). We can avoid this issue
and the fuzziness it induces in our design by focusing on (selected) workers laid o from 1997 on,
and who did not appear in another job in previous years.42 For those workers, only tenure in the
lost job denes the UI benets they are eligible for. Our sample of analysis consists of any worker
aged 18 to 54, involuntarily laid o by a private formal rm between 1997 and 2000 from the same
30 metropolitan areas considered in our rst empirical strategy (S~ ao Paulo included). We include
workers who had between 15 and 36 months of tenure at job{loss.43 We also consider a smaller
tenure window (18{30 months). Individuals with tenure levels below (resp. above) the 24{month
threshold are eligible for 4 months (resp. 5 months) of UI. According to the 1994 UI legislation, a
partial month of tenure may count as a full month for UI eligibility purpose. Therefore we exclude
41The tenure distribution at separation in the case of quits (not shown) is perfectly smooth over its whole support.
42Because maximum benet duration depends on the number of months of formal employment in the 36 months
prior to dismissal, we cannot sample workers laid o before 1997 (we need at least 3 years of data prior to the layo).
We do not consider layos occuring after 2000 because we want to follow individuals up to 2 years after layo.
43The slope of the tenure density changes closer to the 12{month threshold on Figure 7, suggesting selection.
19workers with tenure levels between 23 and 24 months from the analysis.44 Finally, as we do not
observe the actual take{up of benets, we estimate the reduced form eect of being eligible for an
additional month of UI benets.
4.3.2 Graphical evidence
Figure 8 presents formal reemployment hazard rates for 2 samples of workers with tenure levels
at layo just below and just above the 24{month threshold. In both cases, hazard rates are low
while collecting benets, but jump up after benet exhaustion. Formal reemployment hazard
rates are visibly lower in months 2, 3 and 4 after layo for workers eligible for a 5th month of
UI benets. Figure 9 presents graphical evidence for the eect of an extra month of UI at the
tenure discontinuity. Panel (a) shows that aggregate formal reemployment hazard rates, just prior
to collection of the extra benet, jump down at the tenure threshold by about 44%. Panel (b)
reveals that survival rates out of formal employment are higher by about 2.5 percentage points in
month 5 after layo when individuals can collect their extra benet.
4.3.3 Benet collection outcomes
Let Ti be the tenure level at layo falling in tenure bin b. We obtain estimates below by regressing
a variable of interest for individual i (yi) on a constant, an indicator for having tenure levels above
24 months (1(Ti  24)) and two parametric polynomials in tenure, one on each side of the tenure
threshold (f1(Ti);f2(Ti)):
yi = 0 + 11(Ti  24) + f1(Ti) + 1(Ti  24)f2(Ti) + Xi + i (8)
Xi includes controls for age and log wages (4th order polynomials), gender, education, sector,
metropolitan areas, and separation month (dummies). i is an individual error term. The impact
of being eligible for an additional month of UI benets is captured by 1 + f2(24). We display
results for two sets of benet collection outcomes in Table 3: (i) survival rates 1, 4 and 5 months
after layo corresponding respectively to take{up of benets (given the 30{days waiting period),
and potential collection of a 4th and a 5th month of UI benets (S1;S4;S5), and (ii) mean covered




t=1:::5 St=S1). In the Table, we consider polynomials of degrees 1 and 2 for a tenure window of
15{36 months and of degree 1 for a smaller tenure window (18{30 months).45 Standard errors are
clustered by quarter{month tenure bins.
44Including them reduce our estimated impacts as workers with those tenure levels tend to behave as being eligible
for 5 months of UI (see Figure 9).
45We do not present results with higher orders given the risk of over{tting with such small windows and the fact
that the Akaike Information Criterion is higher when we increase the degree of the polynomial.
20In Figure 10, we also present graphically OLS results for survival rates at each month since
layo as well as results from the following logit model for hazard rates (we chose the specication




= 0 + 11(Ti  24) + f1(Ti) + 1(Ti  24)f2(Ti) + Xi + i (9)
where h is an indicator for being reemployed in the month considered (month 0 to 12 after layo)
if not formally reemployed before then. i is an individual error term.
Figure 10 reveals that workers eligible for a 5th month of UI have slightly lower aggregate
reemployment hazard rates from the rst month they collect benets and the percentage reduction
increases throughout the spell: about 18.5% in months 2 and 3 since layo and about 44% in month
4 since layo, prior to collecting the extra UI payment. Those large reductions in aggregate hazard
rates translate into a small increase in the share of workers collecting the extra benet of about
2.5 percentage points (S5). More systematically, Table 3 shows no eect on benet take{up and
small signicant eects on collection of the 4th month of UI. The increase of 2.5 percentage points
in collection of the 5th month of UI is robust across specications and very signicant. Including
covariates has no eect on the coecients. Those eects result into small signicant behavioral
eects on mean covered duration up to 4 and 5 months of about .014 month and .042 month,
respectively. The latter amounts to 5% of the total increase in mean covered duration.
We present heterogeneous impacts on mean covered duration in the Appendix (Table A.5).
Treatment eects are found for each category and are larger for individuals with higher replacement
rates and lower levels of education. We nd a surprisingly large eect for older workers, but because
of our sample selection, those older workers are a small and very selected group.
4.3.4 Sample description and validity of the design
To check the validity of the regression discontinuity design, we systematically test for the absence
of any discontinuous change in the number (aggregating observations by quarter{month bins) and
composition (gender, age, education, log wages, replacement rates, and sectors) of observations on
each side of the discontinuity. We use the same OLS specications as above. Results are presented
in Table 4. The sample diers from the sample for the temporary UI extension: it has more
female workers, younger individuals, less workers with very low education levels, less workers in
the industrial sector, and higher replacement rates. Estimates using quadratic tenure controls or
the shorter tenure window support the validity of the design even though specications using the
larger tenure window and only linear tenure controls reveal some signicant dierences. Those
latter specications being less exible, they are more likely to be aected by observations further
away from the discontinuity. We thus interpret Table 4 as an overall validation of our empirical
strategy. Moreover, our results of interest on Table 3 are similar with the dierent specications
and with or without inclusion of the set of controls.
214.3.5 Reemployment outcomes
We present results on longer{term reemployment outcomes applying the same OLS specications
in Table 5. Extending UI benets led to longer{term impacts. Restricting attention again to the
2 years following layo, we nd a .18 month increase in the duration out of formal employment
(baseline 15.33 months), and a .12 month decrease in the number of months of formal employment
in the 2 years following layo (baseline 6.2 months, not signicant at conventional levels). We also
estimate a decrease of about .8 percentage point in the share of workers experiencing at least one
new layo from the formal sector (baseline 27.5%). Our estimates imply a positive impact of .22{
.35 month (baseline 22.55 months) on the subsequent average formal employment duration before
layo (corresponding to DF in our model).46 Therefore, once again, we nd no evidence that UI
extensions decrease average contributions to the UI budget per UI spell. We nd some evidence
of a positive impact on log real wage if employed on Dec 31st 2 years after layo. However those
results are too sensitive to specications and to the inclusion of controls to be fully conclusive (the
same is true for characteristics of the rst new job| results available upon request).
4.4 Summary of results
We now summarize and compare our results with the existing literature.
4.4.1 Benet collection outcomes
Even though contexts and sample selections dier in some important respects, UI extensions in
our two empirical strategies have very similar impacts on the shape of the hazard function of
reemployment in the formal sector. The spike at benet exhaustion is entirely due to the UI
program and individuals are forward{looking. Several papers (Card and Levine, 2000; Card et al.,
2007a; Schmieder et al., 2011) have found evidence of anticipation behaviors in developed countries.
As derived in section 2, the relevant impact for the UI budget and for welfare is the change
in mean covered duration, and to which extent it is due to a behavioral rather than a mechanical
eect. We could estimate the mechanical eects by observing survival rates for workers unaected
by the UI extensions. We directly estimated the behavioral eect in our regression discontinuity
design. Our estimates of the behavioral eect in the temporary UI extension are lower{bounds, as
they do not allow for behavioral responses directly upon layo. Therefore, we simulate how mean
covered duration would have changed had workers known about the UI extension upon layo. In
particular, we extrapolate estimates of anticipation behavior we obtained with the May sample,
on hazard rates from the start of the UI benets collection period (as in Card and Levine, 2000).
46Using mean values for workers with tenure levels just below the 24{month threshold as baseline and applying our





22To gauge the role of anticipation, we also present results mimicking the actual timing of the 1996
temporary policy. Results from the simulations are displayed on Table 6.47
Formal reemployment rates being low, the mechanical eect is large: the control group would
have collected an extra 1.555 UI payment if benets had been extended by 2 months. The behavioral
eect (with anticipations) implies a .1 month increase in mean covered duration when benets are
extended by 1 month, or about 11% of the overall increase. The behavioral eect estimated in
the regression discontinuity analysis is smaller (.043 month or about 5% of the increase in mean
covered duration) because formal reemployment rates are smaller in this sample. Both empirical
strategies reveal that large percentage changes in formal reemployment hazard rates have only
limited eects on mean covered duration, in particular compared to the mechanical eect. Few
papers actually estimate impacts on mean covered duration. For the US, Katz and Meyer (1990)
estimates an increase in mean covered duration of 2.1 to 3 weeks when 13 additional weeks are
oered. The marginal behavioral eect in their study ranges from .092 to .132 month (43% of
the increase is due to a mechanical eect). Therefore if the behavioral eect in absolute terms
does compare to our estimates, the striking dierence is that it would amount to 57% of the total
increase in mean covered duration. Card and Levine (2000) studies a temporary UI extension in
New Jersey in 1996 but only estimates the impact on mean covered duration of regular benets and
therefore only estimates anticipated responses to increased benets. They obtain that a 13{week
UI extension increases mean covered duration of regular benets (the rst 26 weeks) by 1 week, or
a marginal eect of .077 month. This is much larger than our estimates (.014 or .025 depending on
the empirical strategy) but consistent with the estimates from Katz and Meyer (1990). Schmieder
et al. (2011) uses variations in maximum benet duration in Germany for workers above 42 years
old. They estimate that increases in mean covered duration range from a third to a fourth of the
increase in maximum benet duration. This is similar to what Katz and Meyer (1990) nds for the
US and much smaller than our estimates but benets are oered for a longer period in Germany.
Unfortunately, they do not report the share of the increase due to behavioral responses.
4.4.2 Longer{term outcomes
We estimated impact of UI extensions on overall duration outside the formal sector 3{4 times larger
than the eect on mean covered duration. This is because reemployment rates did not increase
47As the regression discontinuity analysis reveals that there is no sign of an eect in the rst month of benet
collection, such an extrapolation may actually overestimate the behavioral eect on mean covered duration. The
Baseline scenario is obtained through non{parametric estimation of the hazard function for the control group in
1996. We then apply our estimates for the impact of a UI extension on aggregate reemployment rates and recover
survival rates and mean covered duration. In the tables, we study mean covered duration conditional on take{up as
it is similar to what authors have studied in the US but the relevant statistics is actually unconditional mean covered
duration. Using unconditional mean covered duration instead slightly reduces our estimates.
23sharply enough after exhaustion of the extended benets for survival rates to recover rapidly. In
absolute terms, this is much larger than estimates from Schmieder et al. (2011, marginal eect .1{
.13 month) for Germany or Card et al. (2007a, marginal eect .1 month) for Austria. However, it is
actually smaller in terms of elasticity because average duration between 2 formal jobs is also longer
in Brazil. Nevertheless, it is interesting that workers delaying formal reemployment in response to
UI extensions do not reappear in the formal sector right after exhaustion of the extended benets,
as anecdotal evidence would have suggested. We even nd some negative impact on the probability
to be ever formally reemployed in the 2 years after layo. This result is only signicant for the 1996
temporary extension and it relies on the common{trend assumption to be valid in the long{run,
but estimates imply that a marginal UI extension announced shortly before exhaustion of regular
benets reduces this probability by about 1.4% (point estimates for the regression discontinuity
range from .5%{1.5%). Importantly, because the impact on overall duration is larger than the
impact on covered duration, this is not due to moral hazard while collecting benets. We cannot
provide much insight on the underlying mechanisms but our results echo an argument that UI might
help transit to self{employment in Brazil where starting capital is small (Cunningham, 2000).
A larger duration out of the formal sector reduces the time spent formally employed and the
share experiencing a new layo from the formal sector. Combining both results, we nd non{
negative impacts on average formal employment duration before layo, the relevant margin for UI
revenues. This is consistent with simple theories (see section 2) but we are not aware of any paper
actually estimating this statistics. Finally, we do not nd conclusive evidence of an eect of UI
extensions on subsequent job characteristics in the formal sector. This is also the case in Card et
al. (1997), Schmieder et al. (2011) and van Ours and Vodopivec (2008).
5 Labor status of UI exhaustees
So far, we estimated that eciency costs from UI extensions were small. In the normative framework
of Section 2, this implies that the social value of transferring income to UI exhaustees need not be
high for a UI extension to increase welfare. However, in a context of prevalent informal employment
and imperfect monitoring of labor status, many UI exhaustees may be reemployed informally or
self{employed reducing the need for income support. In this section, we thus estimate the share of
UI exhaustees actually unemployed using Brazil's monthly urban labor force surveys (PME) from
2003 to 2010. Using 2 consecutive interviews, we can estimate the job{nding probability in the
subsequent month given respondents' duration in non{employment.48 We estimate transitions out
of non{employment by maximum likelihood for individuals laid o from a formal job with more
than 2 year of tenure (for comparability with the samples used in Section 4). We then use our
48For workers who nd a job, we are unable to estimate later transition to other jobs because questions about past
unemployment spells are not asked then and the panel is too short.
24results to estimate the share still unemployed by the time they exhaust UI benets.49
In the surveys, respondents are asked about month since layo (and not number of weeks as in
CPS). Therefore we assume that the hazard function out of non{employment is piece{wise constant
over each 30{days period. We dene m as the daily hazard rate constant over a 30{days period,
m = 0::10 months since layo. We also have to correct for a stock sampling issue within month.
Suppose a respondent is interviewed on day b 2 [0;30] within month m since layo. The probability
that she is found reemployed in the subsequent interview is thus:
P (30m + b < T  30m + 30 + b) = 1   exp( (30   b)m   bm+1)
Moreover, she can only be observed on day b if she survived b days without a job, given that
she survived already m months. If we dene k(b), as the distribution of interviews over days within
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In the estimations, we assume that interviews are uniformly distributed over the month, k(b) =
1=30. For simplicity, we also set i = i+1 for i = 1;3;5;7;9 such that we only estimate 6 parame-
ters.50 Once point estimates for the parameters are obtained, the probability to be unemployed 5
months after layo is:
P (T  30  5) = exp( 30(0 + 21 + 23))
Estimations are performed using the sampling weights and clustering standard errors at the
individual levels. Table 7 presents our results. Point estimates for job{nding rates hazard rates
are higher early in the non{employment spell in particular in the rst month. Without our stock
sampling correction we would have thus underestimated job{nding rates. Our results imply that
35% of workers are still unemployed by the time they exhaust UI benets |a gure comparable to
49Samples are representative of the overall labor force in the six largest metropolitan areas in Brazil, which does
not guarantee that they are representative of the non{employed labor force with more than 2 years of tenure in the
last job.
50The whole purpose of the stock sampling correction is to avoid underestimating the hazard rate in the rst 30
days after layo. We also performed our estimation without this assumption: estimates typically alternate a low and
high value of the lambda's but results for the share still unemployed at benet exhaustion are unchanged.
25UI exhaustion rate| and 29% one month later. Thus not every UI beneciary is working informally
while collecting benets, but a signicant share may be doing so. Among the workers reemployed
but not as formal employees, the surveys reveal that 30.5% are self{employed, 2% are employers
and 67.5% are informal employees.
Another way to inform about the social value of transferring income to UI exhaustees is to
consider net earnings and disposable income for formal employees and potential UI exhaustees.51
Table 8 shows that average monthly earnings are about R$744 for formal workers with more than
2 years of tenure. Workers who did nd a new job as formal employees before benet exhaustion
are earning R$448 in their rst month of employment. Workers who did nd a new job outside the
covered formal sector are earning R$150 less and enjoying R$90 less in disposable income or about
half the level of disposable income of formal workers with more than 2 years of tenure. The average
level of disposable income of the unemployed around benet exhaustion is about a third of the level
of disposable income of formal workers with more than 2 years of tenure, but 30% had no other
income at all in the household. We do not have information on actual consumption and saving
levels, but smoothing consumption in case of income shocks tends to be more dicult in developing
countries (see Chetty & Looney, 2006, for employment shocks). Therefore Table 8 suggests that
the social value of transferring income to UI exhaustees is likely to be positive.
We combine these results with our estimates of eciency costs to discuss welfare in the next
section.
6 Welfare eects of UI extensions
We estimated that UI extensions have a large impact on mean covered duration but mostly through
a mechanical eect. Therefore, eciency costs are actually low in Brazil. Welfare eects may still
be negative if the social value of transferring income to UI exhaustees is small, for example if
many UI exhaustees are reemployed informally. We estimated that the share of UI exhaustees
still unemployed is around 35%, a gure comparable to the US. In this section, we evaluate welfare
eects of UI extensions by feeding our results into the sucient statistics formula derived in Section
2. Given that our estimates apply to workers with more than 2 years of tenure, we only consider
this specic group. Because the only statistics we cannot provide an estimate for |the social value
of transferring income to UI exhaustees| is intrinsically subjective, we proceed in two steps.
1. Bounding the social value consistent with positive welfare eects.
From equation (3), we can recover the minimum social value of transferring income to UI exhaustees
consistent with positive welfare eects. Our estimates of eciency costs range from 5% to 11%.
Therefore, welfare eects from UI extensions would be positive if the social value of $1 is 5.3%
51In R$ of 2002. Minimum wage was R$200 in 2002 and the average exchange rate was 2.92R$/US$. Disposable
income is household income per capita using equivalence scales of
1
2 for children.
26to 12.3% larger for UI exhaustees than for individuals contributing to the UI budget (typically
the formally employed). As a comparison, Chetty (2008, for the US) estimates that the social
value of $1 is 150% larger for UI beneciaries at the start of their unemployment spell than for
employed individuals. The social value consistent with positive welfare eects in our context is thus
rather small. Yet, some UI exhaustees may be reemployed in jobs undetected by the UI agency by
the time they exhaust benets, potentially reducing the need for income support. Using equation
(4), we can recover the minimum social value of transferring income to unemployed UI exhaustees
consistent with positive welfare eects, assuming that the social value of transferring income to
the informally reemployed is nil. This assumption may seem extreme given that the informally
reemployed experience lower levels of disposable income than the formally (re{)employed (Table
8). Nevertheless, we are interested in providing bounds and Maloney (1999) argues that non{wage
benets from informal self{employment may be important. With this assumption and a share of
29% still unemployed 1 month after benet exhaustion |O(P) in the formula|, welfare eects are
positive if the social value of transferring income to unemployed UI exhaustees is at least 14%{33%.
To evaluate arguments that the prevalence of informal employment and imperfect monitoring
of beneciaries may preclude a social insurance program such as UI to increase welfare, we also
use the US as a benchmark. Katz and Meyer (1990) estimates a similar measure of eciency costs
from UI extensions at about 57% in the US. As a consequence, the social value should be larger
than 100% in the US for a UI extension to be welfare{improving. Therefore, extending comparable
UI programs|5 months in Brazil, 6 months in the US| may be more likely to increase welfare
in our context. Importantly, this holds even if we assume no gain from transferring income to
UI exhaustees reemployed in jobs undetected by the UI agency. Even though the UI program is
relatively costly in Brazil, it is potentially very benecial.52
2. Approximating consumption using disposable income.
Imposing more structure on our normative framework, we can combine (4) and (5) to estimate the
social value for typical levels of relative risk aversion. In Table 9, we simulate welfare eects using
such a derivation and average measures of disposable income from Table 8 as consumption proxies
|we do not observe consumption. If individuals have signicant liquid savings to deplete when
unemployed,53 we should consider smaller values for the risk aversion parameter as the availability
of liquid savings decreases local relative risk aversion (Chetty and Szeidl, 2006). For the informally
employed, we only have information for the rst period of reemployment so we assume those
disposable income levels still hold around benet exhaustion. We obtain I(P) as S(P)   O(P).
Finally, to bound our results, we also consider the case where there is no social value of transferring
income to informally reemployed UI exhaustees. We use estimates of eciency costs from both
52Imperfect take{up of benets would reduce welfare gains but take{up is unlikely to be lower in Brazil than in
the US as it is believed to be very high there (Hijzen, 2011).
53It is not the case in the US (Chetty, 2008).
27empirical strategies and present the social value corresponding to each risk aversion parameter.
Unless risk aversion is particularly low,54 the simulations suggest that a UI extension increases
welfare. Welfare gains could be sizeable: with a coecient of relative risk aversion of 1 and no
gains from transferring income to informally reemployed UI exhaustees, extending benets from 5
to 6 months is equivalent to raising total formal payroll by .086%{.13% for the group of workers
we consider. These results indicate that imperfect monitoring of UI beneciaries' eligibility does
not preclude a UI program, comparable to the US system, to increase welfare.
7 Conclusion
Our paper investigates the impact of UI extensions on labor market outcomes and welfare in Brazil,
where informal employment is prevalent and monitoring of labor status imperfect. We estimate
that extending UI reduces hazard rates of formal reemployment by about 50% when collecting
extra benets. Individuals are forward{looking as hazard rates are also reduced earlier in the UI
spell. Nevertheless, such a behavioral eect amounts to only 5%{11% of the total increase in mean
covered duration |a measure of eciency costs| because reemployment rates in the formal sector
are low, even after benet exhaustion. Therefore, contrary to a prior that imperfect monitoring may
exacerbate behavioral responses, we estimate eciency costs to be small. This result and the fact
that a signicant share of UI exhaustees are actually unemployed imply that welfare eects from
extending benets (and thus from the UI program itself) are likely to be positive in our normative
framework. Imperfect monitoring could lead to larger distortions if potential beneciaires were
more willing and better able to adjust their labor status in response to UI incentives. But typical
views on the presence of a large informal sector (Fields, 1975; Maloney, 1999) are actually consistent
with such small eciency costs. Social insurance programs, such as UI, may thus increase welfare
in this context.
Why then have only a few middle{income and developing countries, most of them sharing
a similar context, implemented UI programs so far? First, if social insurance tends to expand
with economic development, the actual timing of expansions is often related to political economy
considerations. But the list of countries implementing or considering the implementation of UI is
growing.55 Second, many countries have historically relied on job protection rather than worker
protection institutions. Heckman and Pages (2004) argues that such regulations appeared \much
earlier in the development process as a low{cost way (from the point of government scal authorities)
of providing social insurance." Third, even benet taxes are often viewed as more distortionary
in poorer countries (Levy, 2008). A higher cost of taxation can be captured in our normative
54For example if households had more liquid savings or easier access to credit in Brazil than in the US.
55At the extreme, if formal jobs are too rare and unstable, workers would not value insurance. A similar argument
might justify UI benets increasing with tenure duration as layo risk decreases with tenure.
28framework through a lower social value of transferring income away from contributing individuals.
Evidence of tax avoidance abound. However, there is very little evidence on the relevant elasticities
with respect to tax rates in poorer countries. Moreover, recent studies show that such an elasticity
might not be as high as previously thought.56 This is a promising avenue for future research.
We have not considered externalities sometimes associated with informal employment. In theory,
UI may actually decrease informal reemployment rates if income eects are large. We nd that
UI extensions increase overall duration outside formal employment, and the impact is larger than
on mean covered duration. This is consistent with an increase in informality but existing data are
not rich enough to directly tackle this question. However, externalities would have to be sizeable
to reverse our conclusion that the existing UI program likely increases welfare for our sample
of Brazilian workers. Our normative framework also abstract from other reasons why an envelope
argument does not apply, such as search frictions and wage bargaining. In this specic case, welfare
eects from UI may be even higher (Landais et al., 2011).
The usual normative prescription to prevent responses to UI at the layo margin is the full
experience{rating of benets. Generally, the recent optimal UI literature (our paper included) then
abstracts from this margin. In practice, experience{rating may be particularly relevant in countries
where monitoring is imperfect, as manipulating layos may be easier. However, if the social cost
of levying layo taxes is higher (if rms are credit{constrained), it may not be optimal to have full
experience{rating of benets (Blanchard and Tirole, 2006). The prevalence of high ring costs in
developing countries suggests that experience{rating of benets is a feasible option. Moreover, we
nd suggestive evidence that existing institutions may already prevent such responses.
Although our results have been obtained for a specic program, for a particular country and
group of workers, our analysis indicates that the prevalence of informal employment and the imper-
fect monitoring of beneciaries' eligibility need not preclude social insurance programs to increase
welfare. The relevant patterns for our results in the case of UI |low formal reemployment rates
and a signicant share of workers still unemployed a few months after layo| are likely to prevail
in other settings, in particular in Latin America. Considering workers attached to the formal labor
force is also a natural rst{step as only workers who adjusted to their employment situation would
value insurance. Understanding if our ndings apply for dierent programs and in dierent settings
remains an important topic for future research.
56Kleven and Waseem (2011) nds a small elasticity at the intensive margin in Pakistan. Studies of the impacts
of Seguro Popular, a Mexican program extending health care to the informally employed, nd small eects at the
extensive margin compared to the large positive shock on informal wages implied by the program (Azuara and
Marinescu, 2011; Barros, 2008; Campos{Vasquez and Knox, 2008; Bosch et al., 2010; Aterido et al., 2011).
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33Table 1: Di{in{di results for benet collection outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean Control years
Control both 1995 1997 both 1995 1997
S(5) .7946 .0044 .0059 .001 .005 .0054 .0023
(.0094) (.0103) (.0102) (.0095) (.0104) (.0099)
S(7) .673 .0667*** .0706*** .0608*** .068*** .0716*** .0619***
(.0098) (.0106) (.011) (.01) (.011) (.0106)
P
t=1:::5 S(t)=S(1) 4.674 -.0085 -.0045 -.0158 -.0092 -.0068 -.0155
(.014) (.0134) (.0163) (.0148) (.0143) (.0165)
P
t=6:::7 S(t)=S(5) 1.758 .1207*** .1255*** .1154*** .1218*** .1283*** .1145***
(.0124) (.0133) (.0129) (.0124) (.0138) (.0124)
Whole sample (logit)
h(5) .0892 -.7293*** -.7437*** -.7132*** -.7357*** -.7592*** -.7114***
(.0728) (.0779) (.0737) (.0736) (.0817) (.0709)
h(6) .0701 -.7705*** -.802*** -.7305*** -.7878*** -.8295*** -.7396***
(.0596) (.0708) (.0549) (.06) (.072) (.0541)
May only (logit)
h(4) .0444 -.2065** -.2809*** -.1086 -.2067** -.2825*** -.1053
(.0819) (.0889) (.0925) (.081) (.0888) (.0907)
h(5) .0847 -.7749*** -.7846*** -.7645*** -.7836*** -.8013*** -.7635***
(.0856) (.0902) (.0918) (.0876) (.0952) (.089)
h(6) .0615 -.7476*** -.7771*** -.7089*** -.7708*** -.8097*** -.7268***
(.0605) (.0668) (.0719) (.0627) (.0695) (.0724)
Other controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Results for the 1996 temporary UI extension. The top quadrant shows impacts on survival rates out of the formal sector and
covered duration. As eligible beneciaries learned about the extension shortly before exhaustion of regular benets (month 5
after layo), the impacts are observed only late in the UI spell. The second quadrant shows how aggregate formal
reemployment hazard rates are aected (in month 5 and 6 after layo |the spike). The bottom quadrant restricts attention
to workers who learned about the extension earlier in their UI spell and could already adjust job{search in month 4 after
layo (anticipation behavior).
Workers aged 18 to 54 from the largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (S~ ao Paulo excluded), eligible for 5 months of maximum
benet duration and who lost a private formal job in April or May 1995, 1996 and 1997. In 1996, in treatment areas, they were
eligible for up to 7 months of UI. Sample described in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. s.e. clustered by Metropolitan
Area (29 clusters). Signicance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Metropolitan Area xed eects included. Other controls include
4th order polynomials in (normalized) tenure, age and log wage, and dummies for education levels, sector and gender.
34Table 2: Di{in{di results for reemployment outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Whole sample Surviving out up to September
Mean Control years
Outcome Control both 1995 1997 both 1995 1997
Reemployed .6316 -.0162*** -.0164** -.0145** -.0186*** -.0206*** -.0161***
within 2 years (.0055) (.007) (.0066) (.0045) (.0064) (.0057)
Non{employment 13.65 .6007*** .6369*** .5229*** .6996*** .7822*** .6104***
duration (max 24m) (.1662) (.2015) (.18) (.1097) (.142) (.1096)
Months employed in 8.061 -.4488*** -.4896*** -.3674** -.4708*** -.5202*** -.4148***
2 years after layo (.1427) (.1665) (.1513) (.0949) (.1111) (.1036)
At least 1 new layo in .2824 -.019*** -.0283*** -.0082 -.0171*** -.0252*** -.0083
2 years after layo (.0065) (.0093) (.0069) (.0059) (.0087) (.0055)
December employment .4446 -.0031 .0003 -.006 -.0043 -.0024 -.0067
2 years after layo (.0054) (.0067) (.006) (.0056) (.006) (.0065)
December log real wage 5.742 .0126* .0105 .0158 .0042 -.0005 .01
2 years after layo (.0071) (.0094) (.0133) (.0076) (.0104) (.0124)
Results for the 1996 temporary UI extension. The table shows longer{term reemployment outcomes beyond the covered
duration. As eligible beneciaries learned about the extension shortly before September 1996, we restrict attention to
individuals not formally reemployed by September in columns (5){(7). Eligible beneciaries in treatment areas in 1996 stayed
longer out of the formal sector, spent less time in the formal sector in the following 2 years but are then also less likely to have
experienced a new layo from the formal sector (and thus less likely to collect again UI benets). We nd no eect on wages.
Sample as in Table 1 (see notes). s.e. clustered by Metropolitan Area (29 clusters). Signicance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Additional controls for (normalized) log wages, age, tenure (4th order polynomials), metropolitan area, education, sector and
gender (dummies).
35Table 3: Regression discontinuity results for benet collection outcomes
Mean
T<24 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S(1) .939 -.0021 .0002 .0002 -.0024 -.0005 -.0009
(.0026) (.005) (.0033) (.0018) (.0034) (.0024)
S(4) .8744 .0066** .008* .0094*** .0065*** .0066* .0079***
(.0026) (.0043) (.0031) (.0021) (.004) (.0028)
S(5) .8306 .024*** .0248*** .0248*** .0247*** .0244*** .0256***
(.0021) (.0034) (.0027) (.0021) (.0042) (.0028)
P
t=1:::4 S(t)=S(1) 3.867 .0139*** .0147*** .017*** .0133*** .0122*** .0147***
(.0027) (.0037) (.0029) (.0025) (.004) (.0028)
P
t=1:::5 S(t)=S(1) 4.752 .0416*** .041*** .0433*** .0419*** .039*** .043***
(.0039) (.0064) (.0045) (.0036) (.0063) (.0041)
Tenure controls Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic Linear
Other controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Tenure window 15{36 15{36 18{30 15{36 15{36 18{30
Results for a regression discontinuity based on tenure in the lost job (T): workers with more than 24 months of tenure are
eligible for up to 5 months of UI (instead of 4 months). The rst outcome (survival up to month 1 after layo) is a measure of
UI take{up (waiting period of 30 days). The next 2 outcomes measures potential exhaustion of the benets available for
individuals on the left and on the right of the discontinuity, respectively. Similarly, the last 2 outcomes are measures of
covered duration. Extended benets lead to small but signicant impacts on formal reemployment rates, even before the extra
benet is collected. Controlling for covariates has no eect on our results.
See the text for sample selection. Sample described in Table 4. s.e. clustered at the quarter{month tenure level. Signicance
levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Other controls include metropolitan area, separation month and quarter{month xed eects, 4th
order polynomials in age and log wage and dummies for education levels, industry and gender. Full sample has 748246
observations.
36Table 4: Validity of the regression discontinuity design
Mean
T<24 (1) (2) (3)
Observations per bin 10497 695.1 328.9 582.1
(890.8) (1629) (1206)
Male .5747 .0105** .0064 .011
(.0052) (.0117) (.0076)
Age 27.58 -.117* .0033 -.0142
(.0668) (.1246) (.0906)
Less than 8th grade .4194 .0028 .0117 .0076
(.0059) (.0095) (.0074)
8th to 10th grade .3512 .004 -.0048 -.0012
(.0034) (.0059) (.0048)
High school graduates .206 -.0045 -.003 -.0034
(.0041) (.0059) (.0051)
College graduates .0229 -.0022 -.0036 -.0029
(.0014) (.0025) (.0018)
Log wages 5.609 -.0072 .0177 .0314
(.0402) (.0745) (.0553)
Replacement rate .6015 .0018 -.0041 -.0091
(.0126) (.0233) (.0174)
Commerce .3078 -.0093* -.008 -.0109*
(.005) (.0088) (.0062)
Construction .0841 -.0023 -.0028 -.0014
(.0032) (.0064) (.0045)
Services .3987 .0005 .0006 .0045
(.0057) (.0111) (.008)
Industry .2095 .0111* .0102 .0078
(.0059) (.0124) (.0085)
Tenure controls Linear Quadratic Linear
Tenure window 15{36 15{36 18{30
Description of the sample and validity check for the regression discontinuity in Table 3. With more exible specications in
columns (2){(3), there does not appear to be any signicant change in the number and composition of observations on each
side of the discontinuity (our results in Table 3 are unaected when controls are included).
See the text for sample selection. s.e. clustered at the quarter{month tenure level. Signicance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
No additional controls. Full sample has 748246 observations.
37Table 5: Regression discontinuity results for reemployment outcomes
Outcome Mean T<24 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reemployed .562 -.0024 -.0087* -.006 -.003 -.0075 -.0041
within 2 years (.0035) (.0051) (.0045) (.003) (.0052) (.004)
Non{employment 15.33 .1593** .2415** .216** .1642*** .2064* .1728**
duration (max 24m) (.0704) (.1032) (.0863) (.0616) (.1127) (.0785)
Months employed in 6.204 -.0892 -.178 -.1554* -.0921 -.1428 -.1164
2 years after layo (.0663) (.1193) (.0853) (.0593) (.1126) (.077)
At least 1 new layo in .2751 -.008* -.0083 -.0071 -.0082*** -.0089** -.0079**
2 years after layo (.0043) (.0065) (.0054) (.0028) (.0041) (.0035)
December employment .3336 -.0003 -.0012 -.0009 0 .0003 .001
1 year after layo (.003) (.0048) (.0038) (.0026) (.0046) (.0034)
December employment .3573 -.0007 -.0048 -.0037 -.0001 -.003 -.0009
2 years after layo (.0033) (.0061) (.0049) (.0027) (.0052) (.0038)
December log real wage 5.714 -.0049 -.0056 -.0065 -.0047 .0012 -.002
1 year after layo (.0085) (.0178) (.0129) (.0042) (.0067) (.0054)
December log real wage 5.923 .0078 .0039 .0084 .0074* .0123* .011***
2 years after layo (.0077) (.0154) (.0102) (.0041) (.0063) (.0041)
Tenure controls Lin. Quad. Lin. Lin. Quad. Lin.
Other controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Tenure window 15{36 15{36 18{30 15{36 15{36 18{30
Longer{term results for the regression discontinuity in Table 3. Workers eligible for an extra month of UI stayed longer out of
the formal sector, spent less time in the formal sector in the following 2 years but are then also less likely to have experienced
a new layo from the formal sector (and thus less likely to collect again UI benets). Results on wages are not consistent
enough to be fully conclusive.
See text for sample selection. s.e. clustered at the quarter{month tenure level. Signicance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Other
controls include metropolitan area, separation month and quarter{month xed eects, 4th order polynomials in age and log
wage and dummies for education levels, industry and gender. Full sample has 748246 observations.
38Table 6: Simulating the impact of a UI extension of 2 months
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 1996 temporary Adding
extension anticipation
Surviving 4 months out (S4) .8457 .8457 .8599
Surviving 5 months out (S5) .8146 .8204 .8342
Surviving 7 months out (S7) .6888 .7585 .7713
Mean covered duration if 5 months oered 4.711 4.717 4.764
Mean covered duration if 7 months oered 6.266 6.391 6.465
 mean covered duration if 5 months oered .0062 .0523
marginal behavioral eect .0031 .0262
 mean covered duration if 7 months oered 1.555 1.679 1.754
marginal mechanical eect .7776 .7776
marginal behavioral eect .0621 .0992
Simulation of the impact of a 2{month UI extension (i) if workers learned late about the extra benets |column (2), as in
the 1996 extension| or (ii) if they had learned about the extension upon layo|column (3), to gauge the importance of
anticipation behaviors. The behavioral eect is only responsible for 11% of the increase in mean covered duration
(:0992=(:7776 + :0992)), even if we have relatively large anticipation behaviors.
The Baseline is obtained through non{parametric estimation of the hazard function in Control Areas in 1996. The second
column replicates results from the temporary extension by multiplying hazard rates in month 4, 5 and 6 by the percentage
change estimated in those months in Table 1 (using full controls). The third column simulates the impact had workers learned
about the UI extension upon layo by also multiplying hazard rates in months 1 to 3 by the percentage change estimated in
months 4 (anticipation) for the May sample in Table 1 (using full controls). As workers are more likely to adjust job{search
closer to benet exhaustion, this is likely to be an upper bound for the actual scenario we simulate (see Figure 10b).
39Table 7: Maximum likelihood results for the hazard of leaving non{employment
Daily hazard rate constant
per 30{days period Coecient s.e.




7;8 .0069552 *** (.0003371)
9;10 .0064482*** (.0004648)
Data from monthly urban labor force surveys in the 6 largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (PME, 2003{2010). The maximum
likelihood estimation uses equation (10) and information from consecutive interviews about the likelihood to be reemployed in
period t if laid o since m months in period t   1. m is the daily hazard rate of reemployment over the next month if still
unemployed m months after layo. The maximum likelihood controls for a stock sampling issue within month (see text).
Sample restricted to individuals laid o from a formal private sector job with more than 2 years of tenure at layo. Our
results imply that 35% of workers are still unemployed by the time they exhaust UI benets |a gure comparable to UI
exhaustion rate| and 29% one month later.
s.e. clustered by individual (19346 individuals). Estimations using sampling weights. Signicance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
40Table 8: Average earnings and disposable income by labor status (R$)
Individual Earnings Disposable Income
Formal private 744 500
overall
Formal private 540 350
prior to layo
If reemployed as formal employeea 448 322
before benet exhaustion
If reemployed in uncovered sectora 290 231
before benet exhaustion
If still out of any employment 0 172b
around benet exhaustion
Description of earnings and disposable income for workers either formally employed with more than 2 years of tenure or for
workers who were recently laid o from a formal job with more than 2 years of tenure. Earnings and disposable income for
individuals still unemployed around benet exhaustion and for individuals reemployed in jobs undetected by the UI agency are
much lower than for the formally employed.
Own calculations using monthly urban labor force surveys covering the six largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (PME,
2003{2010). Estimations using sampling weights. Units are R$ of 2002. In 2002, the minimum wage was R$200. Sample
restricted to individuals either formally employed since more than 2 years or who had more than 2 years of tenure when laid
o from the formal sector (to mimic samples from RAIS in other Figures and Tables of the paper). Disposable income is
dened as total family income divided by the number of family members using an equivalence scale of
1
2 for children.
a Earnings and disposable income in the rst reemployment month.
b 30 % have a value of 0.
41Table 9: Aggregate welfare gains from a marginal UI extension
Welfare gains
Risk aversion Social value Behavioral eect: 5% Behavioral eect: 11%
.5 .2928 .1711 .1039
1 .5856 .3786 .288
2 1.171 .7935 .6562
5 2.928 2.038 1.761
Unemployed UI exhaustees only
Welfare gains
Risk aversion Social value Behavioral eect: 5% Behavioral eect: 11%
.5 .328 .0469 .003
1 .656 .1301 .0863
2 1.312 .2966 .2528
5 3.28 .7962 .7523
Welfare gains are expressed in terms of a percentage increase in formal payroll and are calculated combining equations (4) and
(5). Welfare gains are calculated for our lowest and highest measures of the behavioral eect. The rst quadrant measures the
social value of transferring income to UI exhaustees by multiplying the relative risk aversion parameter by the drop in
disposable income for all UI exhaustees independently of their labor status. The second quadrant assumes that the social
value of transferring income to UI exhaustees reemployed in jobs undetected by the UI agency is nil. Welfare gains are
positive even in this case for every level of risk aversion considered.
Calculations use layo rates and replacement rates for covered workers with more than 2 years of tenure and disposable
income gures from Table 8. Using disposable income to approximate consumption is valid if individuals have little savings to
spend in case of non{employment as it appears to be the case in the US (Chetty, 2008). In case of positive available savings,
one should consider smaller values of the coecient of relative risk aversion in this table (Chetty and Szeidl, 2006).



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data from Botero et al. (2004) can be found at http://iicg.som.yale.edu//. We include every country with a positive value for the
unemployment insurance index and a value for the size of the unocial economy. The former is a measure of the generosity of the UI
program. Various countries with prevalent informal employment have adopted UI programs.















































































































































































P=4: mean covered duration if P=4
S(4): survival out of formal employment 4 months after layo (mechanical eect)
dDB=dP: change in mean covered duration due to behavioral responses
Individuals who survive until t are collecting t+1 months of benets prior to benet exhaustion. Due to behavioral responses, formal
reemployment rates are reduced when benets are extended and the survival out of formal employment decreases at a slower rate.
Before the extension, mean covered duration corresponds to the black area. Extending benets increases mean covered duration
through a mechanical eect, corresponding to the white area (the share of people who could collect the extra benet if they do not
change their behavior), and a behavioral eect, corresponding to the grey area (the change in mean covered duration due to reduced
incentives to nd a formal job).
44Figure 3: Formal reemployment after an involuntary layo from the formal sector





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample of workers eligible for 5 months of UI. Hazard rates are higher before collection of benets (30{days waiting period) and jump
up at benet exhaustion but they are generally low. Indeed, survival rates out of the formal sector are very high. Administrative data
(RAIS, see text). Sample limited to private formal workers with more than 2 years of tenure at layo, aged 18 to 54, involuntarily laid
o in 2000{2001 and working in the six largest urban areas of Brazil (coverage of urban labor force surveys |PME).
Figure 4: Timeline of the 1996 experiment
During the temporary UI extension in 1996, 2 additional UI payments were available for workers who had exhausted their regular UI
benets and had not found a new formal job by September 1st. Any additional UI payment had to be paid between September 1st and
December 31st. The idea of a temporary extension was rst mentioned in the media on August 14th and the extension was actually
enacted on August 21st.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Workers aged 18 to 54 from the largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (S~ ao Paulo excluded), eligible for 5 months of maximum benet
duration and who lost a private formal job in April or May 1995, 1996 and 1997. In September 1996, in treatment areas, they learned
that they would be eligible for up to 2 additional UI payments. After September, survival rates (resp. hazard rates) stay higher (resp.
lower) in treatment areas in 1996, at least until exhaustion of the extended benets. The spike in hazard rates at exhaustion of regular
benets entirely disappear when benets are extended.





























































































































































































































































































































































































The gure presents the distribution of tenure at layo for workers, aged 18 to 54, involuntarily laid o by a private formal rm between
1997 and 2000 (who did not appear in another formal employment in our data prior to 1997). Vertical lines indicate tenure thresholds
related to UI or ring costs legislation. Workers with more than 6 months, 12 months or 24 months of tenure at layo are eligible for
3, 4 or 5 months of UI, respectively. In Brazil, ring costs are discontinuously increased at 3 months of tenure (end of probationary
period) and 12 months of tenure (administrative process for layos is made heavier). The distribution shifts down when ring costs
increase and shifts up when workers are rst eligible for UI but not at the other UI thresholds.




























































































































































































































































































































Workers with tenure levels at layo between 18 and 24 months are eligible for 4 months of UI. Workers with tenure levels at layo
between 24 and 30 months are eligible for 5 months of UI. Hazard rates are visibly lower by month 2 after layo for workers elegible
for an extra month of UI; the spike is shifted by exactly one month. Sample for the regression discontinuity around the 24{month
tenure threshold, restricted on tenure. See the text for sample selection.
47Figure 9: Graphical evidence for a discontinuity around the 24{month tenure threshold
(a) Formal reemployment hazard rate in month 4 after layo (before












































































































































































































































































(b) Survival rates out of formal employment in month 5 after layo























































































































































































































































































Workers with more than 24 months of tenure at layo are eligible for a 5th month of UI. Their formal reemployment hazard
rate is lower prior to collecting the extra benet and they are more likely to survive up to 5 months after layo, exhausting
the extended benets. See the text for sample selection. Observations are aggregated at quarter{month tenure levels. The
eligibility status of workers with tenure between 23 and 24 months is unclear according to UI laws, those observations are
thus not included in our analysis.
48Figure 10: Regression discontinuity estimates around the 24{month tenure threshold
































































































































































































































































(b) Impact on aggregate formal reemployment hazard rates (coe-

















































































































































































































































































Results for a regression discontinuity at the 24{month tenure threshold. See notes in Figure 9. Aggregate hazard rates
are reduced when collecting the extra benet but also earlier in the UI spell (anticipation behavior). Survival rates are
higher between months 3 and 5 after layo and then converge back when the extra benet is exhausted. Estimates for
aggregate hazard rates cannot be interpreted as impacts on individuals behaviors as they may include a selection component.
Specications for survival rates as in Table 3. Here we present our preferred specications including linear controls in tenure
and a tenure window of 18{30 months at layo. See text for sample selection.
49Table A.1: Distribution of sample across areas and years for the 1996 temporary UI extension
Year Month Control Rio Other Treat Total
1995 April .3 .23 .47 39932
May .31 .23 .46 45732
1996 April .31 .23 .46 37828
May .33 .21 .45 37628
1997 April .32 .22 .45 38289
May .33 .22 .44 38783
All All .32 .23 .46 238192
We have 9 treatment areas (including Rio de Janeiro) and 20 control areas. The treatment areas are larger but the relative
distribution is very stable across years.
Workers aged 18 to 54 from the largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (S~ ao Paulo excluded), eligible for 5 months of maximum
benet duration and who lost a private formal job in April or May 1995, 1996 and 1997.
A Appendix: Tables and Figures
50Table A.2: Composition of sample across areas and years for the 1996 temporary UI extension
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Year Control Rio Other Treat Treat{Control
Male 1995&1997 .656 .6748 .6707 .0161 (.0121)
1996 .6653 .6778 .6653 .0041 (.0128)
Age 1995&1997 32.2 34.21 33.06 1.246*** (.3323)
1996 32.97 34.39 33.45 .7894*** (.2806)
Less than 8th grade 1995&1997 .4585 .4342 .4673 -.0023 (.0251)
1996 .4874 .4592 .4802 -.014 (.0242)
8th to 10th grade 1995&1997 .3118 .2937 .2771 -.0291*** (.0104)
1996 .2968 .2863 .2618 -.027** (.0119)
High school graduates 1995&1997 .2006 .2214 .2221 .0213 (.0215)
1996 .1833 .2107 .215 .0303 (.0199)
College graduates 1995&1997 .0254 .0467 .0292 .0097** (.0049)
1996 .0262 .043 .0309 .0086** (.004)
Tenure 1995&1997 57.62 60.89 57.62 1.087 (1.401)
1996 61.33 61.25 60.59 -.526 (1.642)
Commerce 1995&1997 .2638 .2401 .2523 -.0156 (.0209)
1996 .262 .2598 .2617 -.0009 (.0214)
Construction 1995&1997 .0617 .0618 .0782 .011 (.0115)
1996 .0642 .0573 .0705 .002 (.009)
Industry 1995&1997 .3767 .2532 .3066 -.0879 (.0575)
1996 .385 .2248 .2982 -.1107* (.0592)
Services 1995&1997 .2977 .4449 .3629 .0925** (.0361)
1996 .2888 .4581 .3696 .1096*** (.0394)
Replacement rate 1995&1997 .4734 .4841 .4878 .0131 (.0285)
1996 .4779 .4986 .4991 .021 (.0285)
Log wage 1995&1997 5.614 5.581 5.565 -.0437 (.088)
1996 5.692 5.639 5.638 -.0536 (.0909)
The table presents sample means for several variables by area. Column (4) tests for a dierence in means
between treatment and control areas. There are signicant dierences between treatment and control areas
(larger areas |treatment| have older, more educated job{losers more likely to have been employed in the
service sector) but they appear in both control and treatment years.
Sample as in Table A.2. s.e. clustered by Metropolitan Area (29 clusters) in parenthesis. Signicance levels
in column (4): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
51Table A.3: Robustness of di{in{di results for benet collection outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Collapseda Tripleb Replacementc
data dierence rate above .5
S(5) .0066 .0102 .0126 .0174 .0164
(.0117) (.0088) (.0086) (.012) (.0119)
S(7) .0713*** .0638*** .0665*** .0917*** .0909***
(.0121) (.0092) (.0088) (.012) (.0125)
P
t=1:::5 S(t)=S(1) .0086 -.0139 -.0109 .0103 .0092
(.0184) (.0154) (.0154) (.0123) (.0123)
P
t=6:::7 S(t)=S(5) .1222*** .1071*** .1086*** .137*** .1366***
(.013) (.0139) (.0127) (.0137) (.0141)
Whole sample (log odds ratio) Whole sample (logit)
h(5) -.8015*** -.6749*** -.6848*** -.83*** -.8284***
(.0979) (.0858) (.0812) (.0864) (.0889)
h(6) -.8077*** -.6897*** -.7052*** -.9581*** -.9612***
(.0708) (.0682) (.065) (.0567) (.0581)
May only (log odds ratio) May only (logit)
h(4) -.1345 -.1871** -.1878** -.162 -.1538
(.1126) (.0948) (.091) (.1327) (.1364)
h(5) -.8547*** -.7229*** -.7349*** -.8573*** -.8472***
(.0997) (.0956) (.0922) (.1209) (.1228)
h(6) -.7987*** -.6678*** -.6869*** -.9163*** -.917***
(.0868) (.0631) (.0611) (.0743) (.0723)
Control years both both both both both
Other controls No No Yes No Yes
Robustness results for the 1996 temporary UI extension. Outcome variables are the same as in Table 1 and results are
similar. s.e. clustered by Metropolitan Area (29 clusters). Signicance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%. Other controls
include 4th order polynomials in (normalized) tenure, age and log wage, and dummies for metropolitan areas,
education levels, industry and gender.
a Data collapsed at the metropolitan{area by month{of{layo level (to control for having very unbalanced clusters).
OLS regressions of log odds ratio on collapsed data are equivalent to logit specications using the micro data.
b Triple dierence using workers laid o in July, Aug and Sep in the same year as additional controls.
c Sample restricted to workers with replacement rate above 50%.





All .0044 .068*** .1218***
(.0094) (.01) (.0124)
Male 0 .0624*** .1245***
(.0114) (.0114) (.0127)
Female .0152 .0804*** .1182***
(.0113) (.0132) (.0156)
Repl. rate> :5 .0164 .0909*** .1366***
(.0119) (.0125) (.0141)
Repl. rate<= :5 -.0043 .0453*** .1028***
(.0124) (.013) (.0138)
Age 18{29 -.0067 .0628*** .1342***
(.0093) (.012) (.0128)
Age 30{44 .0139 .0778*** .1268***
(.0115) (.0107) (.0148)
Age 45{54 .014 .0549*** .0737***
(.0138) (.0121) (.0188)
Less than 8th grade .0064 .0801*** .1425***
(.0123) (.0127) (.0162)
8th to 10th grade -.0017 .0621*** .1218***
(.0091) (.0094) (.0137)
High school graduates .0049 .0504*** .0859***
(.0103) (.0109) (.015)
Construction .0376 .099*** .1338***
(.0246) (.0228) (.029)
Commerce .0016 .0815*** .1398***
(.0088) (.0114) (.0146)
Industry -.0059 .0619*** .1304***
(.0134) (.0179) (.0209)
Services .0131 .0602*** .0973***
(.0157) (.0145) (.0106)
Heterogeneity results for the 1996 temporary UI extension. Coecients for the treatment indicator from separate regressions
by category using both control years. We nd a signicant impact on mean covered duration for each category.
Sample dened as in Table 1. Controls include 4th order polynomials in (normalized) tenure, age and log wage and dummies
for metropolitan areas, education levels, sector and gender. s.e. clustered by Metropolitan Area (29 clusters). Signicance




All .0419*** .039*** .043***
(.0036) (.0063) (.0041)
Male .0428*** .0445*** .0476***
(.005) (.0079) (.0066)
Female .0402*** .032*** .0366***
(.0056) (.0101) (.0071)
Repl. rate> :5 .0454*** .0432*** .0461***
(.0046) (.0087) (.0057)
Repl. rate<= :5 .0332*** .0276* .0348***
(.0088) (.016) (.0117)
Age 18{29 .0482*** .0407*** .0479***
(.0048) (.0078) (.0063)
Age 30{44 .027*** .0283** .0292***
(.0074) (.0111) (.0085)
Age 45{54 .0417*** .0798*** .0558***
(.0146) (.0266) (.0196)
Less than 8th grade .046*** .0512*** .0474***
(.0053) (.0101) (.0073)
8th to 10th grade .0426*** .0477*** .052***
(.006) (.0094) (.0067)
High school graduates .0347*** .0023 .0215
(.0107) (.018) (.0134)
Construction .047*** .0443* .0643***
(.0134) (.0234) (.0175)
Commerce .0348*** .0412*** .0394***
(.0069) (.0107) (.0088)
Industry .0338*** .0011 .0197**
(.0067) (.01) (.0091)
Services .0501*** .0582*** .0549***
(.0067) (.0096) (.0078)
Tenure controls Linear Quadratic Linear
Tenure window 15{36 15{36 18{30
Heterogenity results for the regression discontinuity in Table 3. We replicate results in the last row |columns (4){(6)| of
Table 3 for mean covered duration and present coecients from separate regressions by category. We nd a signicant impact
for almost every category and specication.
Sample as in Table 3. Full sample has 748246 observations. s.e. clustered at the quarter{month tenure level. Signicance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%.








































































































Replacement rates depend on the wage in the lost job w (expressed in minimum wages) as follows: 0:8 if w < 1:65;
(0:8)(1:65)+(0:5)(w 1:65)
w
if 1:65  w  2:75;1:87
w if w  2:75. The minimum wage was R$200 in 2002.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The gures decompose overall hazard rates of formal reemployment into \same job" (if a worker's rst new job is back in the same
rm|temporary layo) and \new jobs" (if a worker's rst new job is with a dierent rm). The spike at exhaustion of regular benets
is shifted for both destinations in 1996 in treatment areas. Sample as in Figure 6 restricted to 1996 (treatment year).
56Figure A.3: Robustness test (1996 temporary UI extension), hazard rates of formal reemployment for similar workers laid











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.4: Robustness test (1996 temporary UI extension), hazard rates of formal reemployment for similar workers laid




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Those graphical robustness tests show that the pattern observed in treatment areas in 1996 in Figure 6 is neither observed in the next
local election year nor for workers laid o later in the same years and areas (and thus not eligible). Sample as in Figure 6 except for
dierences mentioned in the titles.
















































































































































































































The graph presents hazard rates of formal reemployment 6 months after layo for every Metropolitan area in our sample and for
treatment and control years separately. In month 6 after layo, in 1996, additional UI payments could be collected in treatment areas.
Metropolitan Areas are ranked by population, the smallest on the left. A vertical line identies a treatment area. Sample as in Figure
6. 95% condence intervals for the empirical hazard rates provided. Belem, one of the treatment areas was smaller population{wise
than some of our control areas. Campinas, one of our control areas, was larger population{wise than some or our treatment areas.
Nevertheless, hazard rates across control and treatment years within a metropolitan area are only statistically dierent from each other
in treatment areas and they are so in every one of them.
58B Appendix: History and Model
B.1 History of UI in Brazil
Unemployment insurance was rst introduced in March 1986. A more complete UI program was
established in the 1988 Constitution and approved in January 1990. The Law created the Workers'
Support Fund (FAT), nanced by rms' payments of a .65% tax on total sales. The fund is managed
by a committee (CODEFAT) composed of representatives of the government, unions and employers
and was designed to nance both the UI program and active labor market policies. In June 1994,
Law 8900 reformed the UI program giving it its current format. The 1994 UI legislation also
enabled the committee to extend UI for some groups of workers (workers in specic regions and/or
sectors of the Brazilian economy) for up to two months without going through any parliamentary
process. The only restriction is that expenditures generated by the additional payments should
not cost more than 10% of UI fund's liquidity reserves. Since 1994, maximum benet duration was
temporarily extended twice (in 1996 and 2009).
B.2 A model of job{search with informality
We present here a simple search model with formal and informal employment opportunities to
illustrate the discussions and derive the formulas from Section 2. This model follows models used
in the optimal social insurance literature (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006; Kroft, 2008). Assume an
agent living for T periods and starting in period 0 with assets A0. In period 0, she might lose
her formal job with some probability s. If she does not lose her job, she stays employed until T,
earning wage wF and paying tax wF each period. Her problem is deterministic and she will have
the following utility in each period t = 1:::T: v
 A0
T + wF (1   )

. If she does lose her job, she
becomes unemployed and eligible for collecting UI benets b for up to P periods unless she nds a
new formal job. We assume for simplicity and coherence with discussions in Section 2 that taxes
are only levied on workers who did not lose their formal job. In this setup, the number of periods





s . The balanced{budget equation






If she does lose her formal job in period 0, she becomes unemployed and can search for a new job.
Given the prevalence of informal employment in most developing countries,57 she can nd with some
probability both formal and informal jobs. For simplicity, we assume this search occurs sequentially
within each period:58 she rst spends some eort looking for a formal job and, if unsuccessful, turns
57South Africa being an often-quoted exception.
58This approach abstracts from any direct "time" substitution between formal and informal search eorts as well
as any search externality. The former eect should increase informal job search when formal job search goes down
59to the informal sector. Additionally, we assume that an agent can keep searching for a formal job
if informally employed. Both formal and informal jobs are assumed to survive until T. The value
function of being unemployed at the start of a period solves:
JO




t Vt(At) + (1   eOF






t Zt(At) + (1   eOI
t )Ut(At)   I OI(eOI
t ) (13)
The value function of being informally employed at the start of a period solves:
JI




t Vt(At) + (1   eIF
t )Zt(At)   F IF(eIF
t ) (14)
V , Z and U are respectively the value function of being formally employed, informally employed or
unemployed in a given period (after job search has occurred). The e's are search eorts normalized
to correspond to job-nding probabilities and the  's are strictly convex search cost functions.
Upper scripts OF, OI and IF stand respectively for transitions from unemployment to formal
employment, unemployment to informal employment and informal to formal employment. 's are
scale parameters for the cost functions. Finally, we have:
Vt(At) = max
At+1
v(At   At+1 + wF) + Vt(At+1) (15)
Zt(At) = max
At+1




u(At   At+1 + bt) + JO
t (At) (17)
where bt = b for t = 1:::P and bt = 0 otherwise and wI stands for the per{period informal wage.
The utility functions v, z and u are assumed to be strictly concave. Interior solutions for the search
eorts in this model must satisfy:
eIF












The main channels discussed in the text, potentially aecting reemployment rates in the formal
sector in developing countries, can be captured by the following comparative statics: dF > 0 (more
dicult to nd a formal job), dwI > 0 (informal employment opportunities more attractive) and
dA < 0 (less resources to cope with income shocks). For illustration, the following is obtained for
one-period changes in the parameters.59 Dene O, F and I as the share of agents unemployed,
by the time constraint. The latter eect should have the opposite eect if the model captures the behavior of a
representative agent because of search congestion.
59The impact on our outcomes of interest of multi-period changes in the parameters includes cross-period eects
whose signs will depend more heavily on functional form assumptions.
60formally employed and informally employed at the end of a given period. In the above model, we
have that:
dFt = Ot 1  deOF
t + It 1  deIF
t








The share reemployed in the formal sector (Ft) decreases with higher search costs for a formal
job and more attractive informal employment opportunities but increases if individuals have less
resources to cope with unemployment. In Brazil, this latter channel is clearly dominated by others.
The same is probably true in other developing countries but there is no theoretical reason for this

















Therefore, higher formal search costs and more attractive informal employment opportunities (resp.
less resources to cope with income shocks) lead to smaller (resp. larger) responses of formal reem-
ployment rates to a UI extension.
B.2.3 Deriving a welfare formula
To derive a welfare formula, we follow Saez (2002) and assume that there are M types of individuals
indexed by m = 1;:::;M whose utilities enter the social welfare function with weight m. In period
0, with probability sm a formal worker (she) may become unemployed and can search for an informal
and/or formal job as in the model described above. Her problem is to maximize Jo
0;m given the
parameters of the UI program and her asset level A0;m. With probability 1   sm, she keeps her
formal job and has utility vm

A0;m
T + wf (1   )

. The problem of the social planner is to maximize
the social welfare function from the point of view of period 0 over the parameters of the UI program
( b













+ wF (1   )

dm (23)





61Applying the envelope theorem and the fact that dx
dP = b dx
dbP , we have the following formula for the

































Dening S(P) as the survival rate out of formal employed at the end of period P, gU
P and gE as
the social marginal welfare weight on the average individual out of formal employment at the end

















































Substituting in the welfare formula, we can obtain the following expression for the welfare impact





































B.2.4 Informality as externality













+ wF (1   )

dm + (I) (29)
where  captures the externality cost from average informality rates I. A negative externality




























gE multiplying the impact of UI extensions on average informality rates provides a scale
for the externality as it is the social value of marginal change in informality rates expressed in terms
of the social value of $1 to the formally employed. Yet we do not know a priori the sign of dI
dP as
it is intrisically ambiguous for job{losers (see below). Moreover, a more generous UI program may
attract workers to the formal sector while the (benet) tax increase may push workers away from
the formal sector. Therefore, not only is the scale of a potential externality dicult to quantify,
but it is also not clear whether UI benets will reinforce or mitigate such an externality.
B.2.5 Informality, substitution and income eects
As discussed in the text, both substitution and income eects of a UI extension will push formal























A negative sign for dIt
dbt would thus reveal that any positive substitution eect is dominated by a
larger negative income eect, a valuable information about the social value of extended UI benets.
The sign of the income eect is itself ambiguous because income eects will decrease search eorts
both when unemployed and when informally employed.
63